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ABSTRACT
International organizations are ubiquitous in the international system and often inter-
vene in domestic political affairs. Interventions can occur because states do not have
adequate infrastructure to govern, because a political regime seeks international legit-
imation of its rule, or because an intervention may prevent political crisis. Whatever
the reason, there are consequences of such interventions for domestic society. This
project asks how interventions sanctioned by international organizations affect indi-
vidual political involvement, specifically attitudes toward democracy and democratic
institutions. I theorize and empirically demonstrate that when an international in-
tervention reinforces existing democratic institutions in a state, individual levels of
confidence in democracy and levels of trust in democratic institutions improve. By
contrast, when an intervention undermines existing democratic institutions, levels of
confidence in democracy and trust in democratic institutions decrease. This research
is important because it shows that the determinants of individual political engage-
ment are not only domestic, but also affected by international-level phenomena. This
means that international organizations and the interventions they regularly employ
in states can meaningfully affect the prospects for democratic consolidation.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION: MULTILATERALISM AND DEMOCRACY ON THE
GLOBAL STAGE
At a recent international economic conference, Director General of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) Christine LaGarde commented on the role of the IMF
in the stability and development of states. She said “The idea of cooperation and
multilaterialism is, of course, at the heart of the IMF’s work...[the IMF] is also help-
ing low-income and transition countries to get a foothold in the global economy and
is working behind the scenes to build capacity and resilience through its technical
assistance” (LaGarde, 2014). These comments reiterate the underlying philosophical
ideas that the creators of multilateral institutions had in mind when designing these
institutions, and speak to their goals in the modern international political economy.
Importantly, it is not only the IMF that is working to help developing states in
times of need. There are many programs that international organizations can use
to help states in times of governing crisis. For example, international election mon-
itoring is common in developing democracies because states seek to send signals to
the international community that their electoral process was fair and transparent
(Kelley, 2008). In cases of civil conflict, the United Nations can deploy peacekeeping
forces intended to protect civilians from the ravages of conflict. In post-conflict sit-
uations, international law bodies have developed hybrid court systems to help states
administer justice to perpetrators (e.g. The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia that was established to try members of the Khmer Rouge regime). These
are just several examples of cases where multilateral organizations like the UN, the
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IMF, and others have programs to intervene in domestic governance when domestic
governing capacity is weak.
Interventions into domestic governance by multilateral institutions have generated
scholarly interest for their effects on societies. As one example, scholars have sustained
interest in understanding how international lending programs administered by the
IMF affect long-term economic growth (Conway, 1994; Przeworski and Vreeland, 2000;
Barro and Lee, 2005; Easterly, 2005; Dreher, 2006). Despite this interest at the macro-
level, however, there has been little inquiry into the effects of these interventions
on individuals. This is surprising given the dramatic changes that these types of
interventions can catalyze in developing democracies. For example, the presence of
electoral monitors has been studied for its effect on electoral outcomes (Bjornlund,
2004; Hyde, 2007), but not for its effect on an individual’s feelings of electoral integrity.
This lack of scholarly attention is surprising given that there are good theoretical
reasons to expect that interventions like election monitoring may affect individual
political involvement. For example, the physical presence of electoral monitors at
polling places visually reminds voters that there are mechanisms in place to detect
and sanction electoral fraud. Thus, merely the presence of electoral monitors may
make an individuals more likely to participate in the electoral process, because mon-
itors may reinforce the idea that votes will be counted fairly. Understanding the
effects of these types of interventions on individuals is important because individual
political attitudes and behaviors are essential to developing a strong civic society and
consolidating democratic governance (Dahl, 1973; Lijphart, 1977; Almond, 1963). If
an intervention is counterproductive in this regard—in other words, if an intervention
creates conditions where individuals become less confident in democracy as a form
of government—they become threats to democratic stability and consolidation in the
places where they are used.
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Aside from understanding the direct effects on individuals, there is another im-
portant reason to understand the relationship between governing interventions and
individual attitudes in politics. Over the past several decades, it has become much
more common for international organizations to intervene in domestic democratic
governance. For example, one of the interventions of interest to this project, inter-
national election monitoring, has gone from being a relatively uncommon occurrence
in the early 1980s to an intervention used in more than 90 percent of elections in
developing democratic countries in the early 2000s (Kelley, 2008) (See Figure 1.1).
Similarly, with increasing globalization, international lending programs have become
more commonplace, especially in times of economic recession (See Figure 1.2). For
this reason, it is essential to understand the effects that international governing as-
sistance programs can affect individuals and how these governing interventions could
be improved to enhance the process of democratic consolidation.
Figure 1.1: Rise of International Election Monitoring
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Year
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
3
Figure 1.2: IMF Lending by Year
An Institutional Approach to the Study of Governing Interventions
The scholarly literature on domestic political institutions has focused on the ways
that different institutional arrangements are formed and the processes governing their
change. The literature has also appraised the effects that different arrangements have
on individual political behavior (March and Olsen, 2006). Theoretically rich, the
variegated work in this tradition has investigated the implications of proportional
versus majoritarian electoral systems for democratic governance (Powell, 2000); the
effect of electoral laws on the number of presidential candidates in national elections
(Jones, 1999); and the ways that consociational institutional arrangements encourage
voter turnout (Lijphart, 1997). Although the role of institutions differs somewhat
between various “institutional” approaches to the study of politics, the unifying theme
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between these approaches is that institutions matter for our understanding of how
and why individuals participate in politics (Hall and Taylor, 1996).
More recently, scholars have started to investigate the formation and change
of multilateral institutions and their associated effects on the interactions between
states. Formal international organizations have received a good deal of attention
(Martin, 2006), but also non-governmental organizations (Florini, 2000), instances of
regional integration with an emphasis on the European Union (Rosamond, 2005), and
the legalization of international relations (Simmons, 1998, 2000). The development
of this literature has focused almost exclusively on the ways in which multilateral
institutions structure interactions between states with little attention focused on the
micro-level implications of this macro-level question.
In the present project, the primary argument is that by examining governing in-
terventions at the institutional level, particularly the ways that the institutions asso-
ciated with the governing intervention interact with existing institutions in democra-
cies, there is an opportunity to predict the effects that these interventions will have at
the individual level. Multilateral institutions not only structure the terms of interac-
tion between states, but also affect the incentives and opportunities for individuals to
participate in domestic democratic politics. Drawing on established theories of demo-
cratic institutions, I propose a theory that links multilateral governing interventions
with a state’s domestic institutional arrangement to explain changes in individual
political attitudes in democratic societies. Of particular interest are the governing
interventions designed by international organizations and the ways in which these
interventions may abruptly reshape the political landscapes within which individu-
als are making political decisions. In cases of international election monitoring and
international lending, the interventions of interest here, the effects of multilateral in-
stitutions are easily observable and consequential for the state and society. However,
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the theoretical expectations generalize beyond these particular interventions to many
different types of multilateral institutions and governing interventions.
Furthermore, by adopting an institutional approach to the study of governing
interventions, different types of governing interventions become comparable. There
is no disputing that different types of governing interventions used by international
organizations should have very different effects on societies and the individuals within
that society. However, by taking an institutional approach to the study of governing
interventions, the aggregate effects of the interventions is not of primary interest;
rather, the the focus is on how institutions associated with the interventions affect
the political landscapes in which individuals make decisions about how and why to
participate in political activities. In this way, the theoretical framework applied here
creates a focused study, in that the interest in each intervention is limited only to
those features related to the research objective. In this way, interventions become
comparable to each other by comparing how these features differ. In other words,
the study focuses on how institutions associated with governing interventions inter-
act with existing democratic institutions in developing democracies, concomitantly
affecting the incentives and opportunities for individuals to participate in politics.
The primary argument here broadly agrees with Keohane et al (Keohane et al.,
2009) by suggesting that multilateral institutions can enhance domestic democratic
governance. However, Keohane et al focuses solely on the macro-level benefits of
multilateral institutions and suggests that while they may enhance democracy, “such
mechanisms may attenuate popular control and so undermine [participatory democ-
racy],” (Keohane et al., 2009, 9). I build on this work by showing that even without
such macro-level benefits for democracy, governing interventions can yield micro-level
benefits by altering the democratic landscape in which individuals form attitudes and
make decisions about politics. In other words, the manner in which governing inter-
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ventions shape incentives and constrain behaviors at the macro-institutional level
has effects for individual political engagement. Thus, multilateral institutions not
only have the potential to enhance domestic democracy at the macro-level but also
have the capacity to solicit positive affect towards an existing democratic system.
Such an argument relies not only on the ways that various institutional arrangements
structure rational individuals’ incentives and opportunities for political participation
(Weingast, 1996; Shepsle, 2006) but also the more recent theoretical development
emphasizing the symbolic cues that institutional arrangements transmit to citizens
about their role in the democratic process (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2010).
Contributions to Recent Scholarly Debates
This project makes important contributions to major debates in the fields of po-
litical behavior and comparative institutions. Most importantly, it contributes to the
debate about the effects of multilateral institutions for domestic democratic gover-
nance by showing one way that these institutions have substantive effects on indi-
vidual political engagement. This contribution can be framed within two particular
strands of literature: First, within the literatures focusing on the effects of domestic
and international institutions. Whereas to this point these literatures have developed
in relative isolation (with domestic institutional context linked to individual political
behavior, and international institutional context linked to the interactions between
states) almost no work has been done that relates various international institutional
influences to this micro-behavioral level. This study is one of the first to theorize
and systematically examine the ways that international institutions associated with
governing interventions can exert effects upon the ways that individuals feel about
and participate in political activities. In this way, it advances our understanding of
the ways that institutions work to structure the rules of political interaction between
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individuals and their systems of government. Put another way, the theory and results
of this study suggest that sources outside domestic society can be significant in the
formation and activation of political engagement in individuals.
Second, this contribution can be framed as the next step in the debate between
scholars of multilateral organizations who have characterized them as “undemocratic”
for a variety of reasons (Dahrendorf, 1999; Rabkin, 2005; Braithwaite and Drahos,
2000) and the more recent challenge to this convention by Keohane et al (Keohane
et al., 2009). I accept premises from both sides of this debate: international institu-
tions can both enhance and undermine domestic democratic governance. However,
I challenge a primary assumption within this debate which is that multilateral in-
stitutions enhance or undermine domestic democratic governance at the systemic
level. Rather, this study changes the analytical focus of the debate to emphasize the
ways that multilateral institutions structure domestic political interactions. In this
way, it advances our understanding of individual political engagement in transitioning
democratic states, and in particular the potential ways that individual political atti-
tudes and behaviors may be altered by governing interventions. This is substantively
important for understanding the conditions necessary to consolidate democratic gov-
ernance and how these conditions can be supported and enhanced when governing
intervention is required for developing states.
More broadly, this dissertation makes a novel contribution to our present knowl-
edge about the processes of institutional formation and change. This research shows
that institutional change can be exogenous to domestic political systems; more specif-
ically, I show that international governance can impose arrangements that alter the
constancy and stability of a states’ institutional arrangement. By showing one way
in which institutions are exogenously transformed, this research demonstrates that
institutional change need not be attributed to an actor in any specific context. To this
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point, rational choice institutionalism has attributed institutional change to changes
in preference ordering or, more recently, to long-term endogenous effects (Greif and
Laitin, 2004). This research shows that multilateral organizations, though not always
present in political exchanges that occur between individuals and their states, can
abruptly and significantly alter the rules by which such exchanges take place. Thus,
it emphasizes that a strictly rational choice or strictly institutional approach to the
study of political behavior will not suffice. A more nuanced account incorporating
both approaches is necessary.
Finally, this research makes important contributions to our understanding of in-
ternational organizations and the ways that they currently operate. Most clearly, it
shows that when international organizations face high costs when states do not com-
ply with their provisions, there is a need to design strong sanctioning mechanisms
within governing interventions to limit the organization’s risk. However, while pro-
tecting the organization from risk, also often undermine democratic governance in
the state where the intervention is deployed. Thus, the results here show the need to
rethink the ways in which international organizations provide governing assistance in
order to come up with ways to protect the organization from undue risk that enhance,
rather than hinder, democracy even when the stakes are high.
Outline of the Study
In this study, I examine the micro-level effects of two particular types of governing
interventions commonly used by international organizations, though I expect that
the theory proposed here generalizes beyond these specific cases to interventions of
other types. First, I examine international lending programs as an example of a
governing intervention that routinely has institutional features that compete with
and undermine existing democratic institutions in states (a negative case). As a
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counterpoint, I examine international electoral monitoring missions as an example
of a governing intervention that commonly has institutional features that reinforce
existing democratic institutions in states (a positive case). In this way, the findings
of this study will show that governing interventions can both undermine or reinforce
democratic governance in states, depending on how the interventions are designed
and implemented in practice.
Furthermore, as noted above, this study is primarily concerned with the effects
that international governing interventions yield at the micro-behavioral level – in
other words, how do international lending programs and international electoral moni-
toring missions affect individual political attitudes, specifically attitudes toward their
government and toward democracy? Though the theoretical expectation is that these
governing interventions will affect the way individuals choose to participate in politics,
that subject is reserved for further study in the future.
I start by elaborating a theory of multilateralism and democracy in Chapter 2,
which provides the groundwork for the empirical portion of the study. In very sim-
ple terms, the proposed theory suggests that when governing interventions support
existing democratic institutions in states, the intervention will positively affect indi-
vidual attitudes toward democracy and toward their government. In negative cases
where governing interventions undermine or replace existing democratic institutions
in states, commonly found in cases of international lending, the intervention will neg-
atively affect individual political attitudes. There are some exceptions to this general
theoretical rule that are elaborated in the next chapter.
For the empirical portion, I use multiple methods to provide evidence in sup-
port of the theory. Chapters 3 and 4 use a cross-national quantitative approach to
examine the relationship between international election monitoring and attitudes to-
ward democracy and international lending programs and attitudes toward democracy,
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respectively. More specifically, these chapters provide cross national quantitative ev-
idence of a statistically significant relationship between the governing interventions
of interest and changes in levels of confidence in parliament, political parties, and
government. These relationships are statistically significant even after controlling
for the most common explanations for changes in political attitudes, like economic
conditions, various demographic controls, and political ideology. As with any cross-
national quantitative study, however, no causal relationship can be definitively identi-
fied. Thus, while they are important for establishing the plausibility of the proposed
theory, these results need to be supported with qualitative evidence to substantiate
the theoretical linkages between governing interventions and individuals. This is the
task of Chapter 5.
Chapter 5 looks at two particular cases – one case of international election moni-
toring and one case of international lending – to establish the micro-level foundations
for the theory proposed in Chapter 2. The chapter looks in depth at international
lending in present day Greece to show that the institutions associated with the emer-
gency lending program have altered democratic institutions in the state. For example,
the lending program has removed opportunities for individuals to hold their govern-
ment accountable, because despite changes in governing parties, no government has
been able to successfully alter the course of austerity imposed by the lending in-
stitutions. In other words, the controls that the IMF and European Central Bank
have implemented to ensure repayment of the loan have also created conditions that
eliminated the ability for citizens to hold their government accountable. Evidence is
presented from Greece and other European Union countries to show that while atti-
tudes were similar between Greece and other EU countries during the Great Recession
(before Greece needed emergency lending), after the emergency lending program was
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implemented, Greece’s attitudes toward government, parliament, and political parties
sharply diverge from other EU countries.
The chapter also looks at the case of elections in Ghana to show the positive effects
of international electoral monitoring. The 2008 election in Ghana was monitored by
the European Union while the 2012 election was not. While there are some differences
between the elections in terms of candidates, the evidence presented indicates that
the presence of the international election monitor made individuals more likely to
accept the election results, even when their preferred candidate did not win. There
was substantial backlash and unrest after the unmonitored 2012 election, as well as
claims of electoral fraud and manipulation by the losing party and their supporters.
It is important to note that the case studies are not theory testing, insofar as I do
not draw strong causal conclusions from the evidence presented. Rather, the goal of
the chapter is to show, when combined with the cross-national statistical evidence,
that of all the possible causes of changes in political attitudes, the relationship between
macro-level governing interventions as a significant motivator for political attitudes
at the micro-behavioral level is plausible and theoretically well-grounded. In other
words, the case studies are used to look for evidence that elements of the governing
intervention can be directly linked to changes in political attitudes.
This study aims to provide a theory and preliminary investigation into the rela-
tionship between governing interventions sanctioned by international organizations
and the political attitudes of individuals. Such empirical connections are difficult to
establish because of the many degrees of separation between macro-level phenom-
ena and micro-level behaviors. However, by adopting an institutional approach to
the study of interventions, meaningful theoretical connections can be made between
these levels. By using cross-national and in-depth evidence from particular cases,
this study shows that international governing interventions are consequential beyond
12
their effects for societies. In order to make international governing assistance more
effective, the findings from this study suggest that policymakers should pay close at-
tention to the design of governing assistance, taking care to ensure that features of
the assistance program do not undermine existing democratic institutions in develop-
ing democracies. For undermining these existing institutions creates a new political
landscape for individuals to navigate, and makes it more difficult to support and
consolidate democratic governance through the hearts and minds of citizens.
13
Chapter 2
A THEORY OF MULTILATERALISM AND DEMOCRACY
International organizations are important venues for governance. As the primary
institutional mechanisms in the international system, they facilitate interstate ac-
tion to address global problems, resolve international disputes, and develop inter-
national standards for governance (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). In addition to these
functions, international organizations frequently provide governing assistance in de-
veloping states where governing capacity is weak (Burnell, 2000). Given their ubiquity
in domestic political contexts, how do international organizations and the forms of
governing assistance they provide to states affect the prospects for democracy and
democratic consolidation?
The prevailing assessment in existing studies is that international organizations
are inherently anti-democratic for a variety of reasons. Dahl (1999) for example,
suggests that international organizations are undemocratic because they require ced-
ing democratic legitimacy to a “bureaucratic bargaining system” which results in
the marginalization of democratic accountability and participation. As a result, Dahl
suggests that an “...international organization is not and probably cannot be a democ-
racy.” Vaubel (2006) similarly concludes that due to the extended chain of delegation
and competing influences, national representatives to international organizations do
not share the interests of the citizens they purportedly represent. As a result, inter-
national organizations become anti-democratic because citizens have no recourse for
holding unelected representatives accountable, even when their interests are misrep-
resented. Beyond the undemocratic relationship between citizens and representatives
in international organizations, Kapur and Naim (2005) argue that international or-
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ganizations can have even more deleterious effects on domestic political systems by
undermining existing democratic institutions. They show that IMF lending programs
often impose a chain of accountability in domestic political systems where state leaders
become accountable to IMF officials rather than their constituents. The implication
is that the ability for citizens to hold their elected leaders accountable, a hallmark of
democratic governance, is temporarily replaced.
A more recent contribution to this debate by Keohane et al. (2009) argues that
while these criticisms may be valid, their narrow focus on the participatory element
of democracy overlooks the ways that international organizations can enhance demo-
cratic governance more broadly. A constitutional conception of democracy is not only
about citizen participation, but also about minority inclusion and deliberation. So,
while international organizations may attenuate the participatory element of democ-
racy, it can enhance these other elements and make positive contributions to demo-
cratic governance at the domestic level. International organizations work to combat
special interests, protect minority rights, and foster widespread collective delibera-
tion of issues and in these ways can enhance domestic democratic governance, even
if popular participation may be restricted by these activities.
Part of the disagreement between these strands of literature stems from the pre-
cise question being investigated. That is, there are different answers to the questions
“Are international organizations democratic?” and “Do international organizations
enhance or hinder democratic governance?” The latter question is the focus of this
project. More specifically, this project seeks to enlighten the ways that international
organizations, particularly through the governing assistance they provide to states,
can alter the domestic institutional context within which individuals make decisions
about how and why to participate in politics. I seek to show how governing assis-
15
tance from international organizations can change individual political attitudes and
behaviors, thereby affecting the stability of democratic governance in a state.
I take a practical approach to conceptualizing democracy by not focusing on “par-
ticipatory” or “constitutional” democracy at a theoretical level, because these con-
cepts are contested and conceptual clarity is essential for analysis (Sartori, 1991; Col-
lier and Mahon, 1993). Rather, I conceptualize democracy as a set of conditions that,
taken together, constitute something approximating democratic governance (Dahl,
1973). The primary advantage of this approach is that the effects of international
organizations and the governing assistance they provide for democracy become ob-
servable.
In broad terms, the argument articulated here agrees with those put forth by
Keohane et al. (2009). However, this project seeks to expand upon their contribu-
tion by providing a more general account of the conditions under which international
organizations, and particularly the governing assistance they routinely provide to
states, can enhance or hinder democracy at the domestic level. The theoretical focus
of this project is on the ways that citizens affect democratic stability and consol-
idation through their attitudes and behaviors (Dahl, 1997; Inglehart, 1997; Ingle-
hart and Welzel, 2005b; Putnam et al., 1994). As such, the theory presented here
links macro-level institutions with micro-level behaviors to show how the primary
institutional features of governing interventions sanctioned by international organi-
zations can change the domestic institutional context in states. This argument does
not assume that democracy-enhancing multilateralism must necessarily attenuate the
participatory facets of democracy. Rather, the theoretical expectation is that interna-
tional organizations enhance or hinder participatory democracy (and any other facet
of democracy) depending on the ways that the institutions associated with governing
assistance interact with the domestic institutional context.
16
The focus on what is referred to as “governing assistance” or “governing interven-
tions” to investigate the relationship between macro-level institutions and micro-level
behaviors is adopted for several reasons. First, the goal of this work is not to pro-
vide a comprehensive account of the ways that international institutions may affect
aspects of individual political behavior. The goal is to show that these linkages exist
and can impact the ways that individuals perceive and interact with their political
systems. Second, governing assistance from international organizations is frequently
relied upon by developing democracies to establish standards, provide services, and
inspire credibility in their political systems (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). As such, gov-
erning assistance has become an important feature in the landscape of not only global
governance, but also domestic governance, particularly in the developing world. Fi-
nally, focusing on governing assistance programs instead of any particular type of
assistance helps to show how the theoretical arguments articulated here apply gener-
ally.
The remainder of this chapter lays out the theoretical linkages that connect in-
ternational governing assistance to changes in individual political attitudes and be-
haviors in domestic political systems. To state these connections briefly, Figure 2.1
provides a schematic representation of the theory. The schematic starts with the do-
mestic institutional context as it exists pre-intervention. This represents a country’s
institutional context before governing assistance and the institutions associated with
it have been implemented in the state. P1 represents the political process generated
by the domestic institutional context before governing assistance. In other words, P1
is the process by which individuals within the state make political decisions.
The theory then introduces a governing intervention from an international or-
ganization. I assume that governing interventions come with a set of institutional
features that are introduced to the domestic institutional context. When the institu-
17
tional features associated with the governing intervention become part of the domestic
political system, the domestic institutional context is altered, which is represented
in the schema. This altered domestic institutional context is what affects individual
democratic attitudes and behaviors through several causal mechanisms. The first is
what I call a direct procedural effect, represented by the arrow from P2 to individual
political involvement. P2 represents the post-intervention political process in the state
generated by the altered domestic institutional context. P2 may change marginally
or substantially depending on the substance and extent of the institutions associated
with the governing intervention. If P2 is more inclusive and contestable (concepts
which are further elaborated in the following section), the changes in democratic at-
titudes and participation should be positive; higher levels of confidence in democracy
and higher levels of participation in traditional forms of democratic activity. If P2 is
less inclusive and contestable than P1, the opposite outcome should occur.
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Beyond this direct procedural effect, there is a less tangible, but still direct, sym-
bolic effect represented in the schema by the arrow from the altered domestic in-
stitutional context to the changes in individual political involvement. When states
adopt new or stronger democratic features into their political landscape, they signal
to citizens that democratic values are important in governing of the state (Kittil-
son and Schwindt-Bayer, 2010, 2012). Moreover, adopting democratic institutions
sends messages to the international community that the state is making an effort to
conform to international norms of legitimate government (Bjornlund, 2004). These
messages can trigger emotive responses from citizens, leading to changes in percep-
tions or behaviors, that affect the quality and stability of democracy (Kittilson and
Schwindt-Bayer, 2012).
Changes in the institutional context in a state may also yield indirect effects
on democracy that are mediated through the outcomes generated by the political
process. Adopting institutions that alter the inclusiveness and contestability of the
political process can change political outcomes by affecting the balance of power be-
tween citizens and elites. These changes affect individuals by affecting the quality
and quantity of government services allocated to them. As I specify later in this
chapter, these theoretical expectations lead to the conclusion that when international
institutions support existing democratic institutions in a state, individuals will be-
come more confident in their political system. Further, I argue that individuals will
be more likely to participate in the traditional forms of democratic activity, because
these channels are responsive and can meaningfully affect political outcomes.
Governing assistance is not created equally, however. When international institu-
tions subvert or compete with the existing democratic institutional framework, the
positive effects for democratic attitudes and participation can reverse. Individuals
may become less confident in their political systems and more likely to resort to
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contentious political activities to articulate political demands. This is because the
international institutions affect the domestic political context by creating conditions
that make it difficult for individuals to navigate their political systems through demo-
cratic channels and by changing the incentives for policymakers to be responsive to
citizens’ political demands. In these cases, I expect that individuals will express lower
levels of confidence in democracy and will participate more frequently in contentious
forms of political activity, like protests and riots. The remainder of this chapter more
explicitly theorizes these causal linkages.
Developing Democracy and Governing Assistance
In more precise terms, what is “governing assistance” and when do states require
it? Governing assistance is defined here as an arrangement that relies on the resources
and capacities of an international organization to supplement, replace, or otherwise
adjust a mechanism of governance in a state as a matter of necessity, consensual
agreement, or force. Such a definition is purposefully broad and applies to a variety
of programs regularly implemented by international organizations. For instance, by
this definition, international lending programs and international election monitoring,
the interventions of interest to this project, are both considered forms of governing
assistance. Beyond these, hybrid court arrangements, peacekeeping missions, and
development aid would all be considered forms of governing assistance. The defining
features of such assistance are that the programs are designed and administered for
particular states and at least partially controlled by an international organization.
However, governing assistance does not always have to be a proactive intervention
into the domestic affairs of states. Sanctions, for example, are qualitatively similar to
these more positive forms of intervention and may yield similar effects on individuals
in states. The picture is complicated by who individuals may blame in the case of
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sanctions levied on a state by an international organization. There may be instances
where individuals assign blame to their government for acting against international
norms. In other cases, target governments may use propaganda and other means
to persuade the public to assign blame to the international community. However,
the theoretical linkages between governing assistance, or perhaps more appropriately
“governing interventions,” are similar.
This project does not consider programs administered by non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) as governing assistance for several reasons. First, NGOs frequently
operate based on a particular agenda (women’s rights, fair labor practices, et cetera),
often without having a motivating concern with stable governance more broadly.
The activities of NGOs may very well matter for individual political involvement,
but the mechanisms through which these linkages occur may be different than those
between formal international governmental organizations and domestic political sys-
tems. Second, focusing on IGOs makes the argument more generalizable because the
“treatment” remains relatively constant cross-nationally with regard to the norms
that govern the provision of such assistance. This does not mean that the treatment
is identical. Rather, I consider “governing assistance” as defined above to be a class
of cases that can be analyzed for their effects on domestic democratic governance. In
this sense, governing assistance is the “treatment” and is more or less constant across
cases.
This project explores two particular forms of governing assistance in the empirical
chapters that represent a structured and focused comparison (George and Bennett,
2005). The comparison is “structured” in that each case of governing assistance is as-
sessed against a standardized set of theoretical questions; primarily whether the main
features of the assistance reinforce or undermine existing democratic institutions. The
comparison is “focused” in that the case studies are not comprehensive, but focus at-
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tention on the main attributes that make the cases comparable for analytic purposes.
There may be doubt as to whether phenomena as varied as international electoral
monitoring and international lending are comparable. Of course there are meaningful
differences between these types of assistance, and in some cases, it may not make
sense to compare them. This analysis, however, compares them by examining only
how they affect the domestic institutional landscape where individuals make decisions
about how and why to participate in politics. In this way, the cases are comparable
insofar as they both yield different effects in this regard through the same causal
mechanisms. Further, international election monitoring and international lending
make for a valuable comparison because they empirically validate the generalizability
of the theoretical arguments presented. 1
Importantly, governing assistance programs are routinely administered to devel-
oping and maturing democratic states that are partially, but not fully consolidated.
Developing democracies are those that have recently transitioned to democracy from
another form of government, and are attempting to consolidate the institutions asso-
ciated with democratic governance. This is one reason that states have an incentive
to invite monitors to observe their elections. There is a tangible benefit to conveying
to the international community that the electoral process was fair and adhered to
international norms of good governance. However, international organizations are
also sometimes required to intervene in states that are not developing democracies
in the traditional sense, but may perhaps be more appropriately called “maturing”
democracies (Lupu, 2010) in the sense that they still face some of the pressures that
developing democracies face in conveying messages of legitimacy to the international
community. Present day Greece, for example, would fall in this category; it has been
1Further justification for case selection is discussed in the empirical chapters.
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a democracy for a relatively long period of time, but in the face of economic trouble,
has faced pressures to demonstrate that the government is capable and effective.
Developing and maturing democracies are rarely forced to accept assistance, but
often seek out programs for different reasons. For example, research on international
election monitoring has convincingly shown that the spread of monitoring missions
in recent times is, at least in part, because the practice has been established as a
norm for holding “legitimate” elections in developing democratic states (Bjornlund,
2004). International lending, by contrast, is most commonly sought when states face
an existential fiscal crisis and are unable to borrow money in private financial mar-
kets (Penalver, 2004). However, in each case, the governing assistance comes with a
specific institutional features that temporarily become a part of the domestic political
context and affect the ways in which individuals interact with their political systems.
Though the interventions are deployed in different ways and for different purposes, the
important point for this analysis is that when present in a domestic political context,
these international institutions interact with the existing institutional infrastructure
to alter the domestic political context in the state.
How is it determined whether governing assistance programs reinforce or under-
mine existing democratic institutions? To arrive at an answer, it is important to con-
ceptualize democracy according to its primary characteristics and to assess whether,
in practice, the primary features of governing assistance programs support these crite-
ria or whether they compete with their fundamental ideas. I rely on the work of Dahl
(1973, 2005) which posits two theoretical dimensions of democracy, contestation and
participation. Contestation refers to the degree to which Dahl’s eight institutional
guarantees of democracy 2 are “...openly available, publicly employed, and fully
21. The freedom to form and join organizations; 2. Freedom of expression; 3. The right to
vote; 4. The right of political leaders to compete for support; 5. Access to alternative sources of
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guaranteed to at least some members of the political system who wish to contest to
conduct of government,” (Dahl, 1973, 4). Participation refers to the “...proportion of
the population entitled to participate on a more or less equal plane in controlling and
contesting the conduct of government,” (ibid). For clarity, the I refer to the partici-
patory dimension of democracy as inclusion so as to avoid the term being conflated
with the outcomes I am trying to explain–the participation of individuals in certain
forms of political activity.
By this metric, determining whether governing assistance reinforces of undermines
democratic institutions existing in a state requires assessing whether the primary in-
stitutional features associated with the assistance increases or suppresses contestation
and inclusion. Visualizing contestation and inclusion as two theoretical dimensions
of democracy means that every regime can be located in a two-dimensional graphing
plane (See Figure 2.2). Both dimensions go from low to high which means that in the
lower left portion of the graph are “closed hegemonies” while in the upper right por-
tion are “polyarchies,” to use Dahl’s language. As a regime moves from the lower left
to the upper right portions on this two dimensional plane, it becomes more inclusive
and contestable. For example, in Figure 2.2, regime A is the least democratic because
the contestability and inclusiveness are relatively low. Regime B allows for more pub-
lic contestation, but is still not an inclusive regime. Regime C is more inclusive, but
allows fewer opportunities to contest the conduct of government.
information; 6. Eligibility for public office; 7. Free and fair elections; 8. Institutions for making
government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference.
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Figure 2.2: Theoretical Dimensions of Democracy
Political regimes can be evaluated on this two dimensional plane before and after
governing assistance is deployed to determine how the institutions associated with
the governing assistance affect the democratic context within which individuals make
decisions about politics. If the change is negative from the prior position (i.e. limiting
contestation or inclusion) I assume that the net democratic effect of the governing
assistance is negative, such that the institutional context of the state is less democratic
than before the governing assistance. A simple example of such a change is illustrated
in the first panel of Figure 2.3. In other words, pre-intervention, the regime illustrated
in the first panel of Figure 3 was more democratic (i.e. more inclusive and contestable)
than post-intervention. By contrast, if the change from the pre-intervention to post-
intervention is positive (i.e. expanding inclusion or contestation), I assume that the
net democratic effect of governing assistance in positive, such that the institutional
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context of the state is more democratic than before governing assistance was deployed.
An illustration of this is presented in the second panel of Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Evaluating the Effects of Governing Assistance
I make a simplifying assumption that changes in inclusiveness and contestatability
lead to the same effects for democracy. In other words, if a political regime were to
gain (or lose) one theoretical unit in inclusiveness, the effect on attitudes and behav-
iors of individuals would be the equivalent to a one-unit gain (or loss) in contestability.
This assumption is not likely to be empirically valid, but is useful for this analysis be-
cause the theoretical arguments presented here do not require this level of specificity
and because of a lack of precise measurement for either of these theoretical concepts.
The argument here requires only on a basic assessment of whether governing assis-
tance, in the aggregate, supports or undermines existing democratic institutions in
the state. I now turn to describing the theoretical linkages between changes in the
democratic institutional context and political attitudes and behaviors followed by a
discussion about the effects these changes have for democratic consolidation and sta-
bility. The discussion focuses on how the theory applies to the two specific cases used
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in the empirical sections of the project, but it should be emphasized that the logic of
the theory applies to other types of governing interventions, as well.
Direct Effects of Governing Assistance on Political Involvement
As noted previously, there are both direct and indirect effects of governing assis-
tance on political attitudes and behaviors. There are two direct effects: the direct
procedural effect and the direct symbolic effect. The procedural effect refers to the
ways that governing assistance changes the procedures by which political decisions are
made in the state. The symbolic effect refers to the ability of a state’s institutional
choices to send signals to citizens about the values and priorities of state and society.
Procedural Effects
Political processes, or the procedures that lead to political decisions, have been
identified as determinants of attitudes toward democracy and government. For ex-
ample, when individuals perceive a process to be fair, they are more confident in that
process and its outcomes, even when outcomes are not those they preferred (Ander-
son, 1998; Feld and Kirchga¨ssner, 2001). In other words, if individuals perceive that
they are playing a fair game, they are more willing to accept a loss than if the loss
had been the outcome of a game that was rigged.
The causal mechanism linking political process to changes in individual political
attitudes becomes more clear when the logic of the arguments posed above is applied.
A state’s institutional context determines how individuals perceive the process by
which political decisions are made (Mishler and Rose, 1997). When this institutional
context is changed by governing assistance, the processes to make political decisions
changes as well. When the process is changed such that individuals perceive it to
be more fair in the way it generates political outcomes, they should express more
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confidence in it and be more satisfied with the outcomes the process generates, in
general. When the process is changed such that it is perceived to be less fair in the
way it generates outcomes, individuals should express less confidence in it and be less
satisfied with the outcomes it produces when the outcomes are not those preferred
by the individual. Taken together, the implication of this finding is that changes to
the political process induced by governing assistance can affect levels of confidence in
the democratic process in states.
Furthermore, procedural changes to the democratic process can alter the incentives
and opportunities for effective political participation, thereby influencing the types
of political activities that individuals most frequently participate in. When individ-
uals are confident that the democratic process in their state is effective, they should
be more willing to articulate their political demands through traditional democratic
channels, like voting, because these are the established institutions where individuals
may express political demands. Where individuals perceive the political process to
be unfair or biased, they may have incentives to participate in politics through other
means, including contentious activities, because the traditional channels of participa-
tion are biased in the outcomes they generate.
Referring back to the two theoretical dimensions of democracy posited above,
there are two possible mechanisms through which this direct procedural effect can
work: first, by changing the inclusiveness of the political process, or altering who is
involved in making political decisions; and second, by changing the contestability of
the political process, or altering what political activities are permissible.
Procedural Effects through Inclusion
Inclusiveness serves an important function in any democracy because being included
gives individuals a say in the conduct of government. Further, being included in
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the political process serves an educative function that helps create democratically
active citizens. Bowler and Donovan (2002), for example, find that widespread in-
clusion helps citizens become more aware of the political process and their role in
it, and that these citizens are more likely to perceive government responsiveness to
citizen demands. Further, they find that when citizens participate in state-level direct
democracy (e.g. referendums or initiatives), they are more likely to feel that they can
influence the conduct of government. When citizens are included in the democratic
process, the effect on individual political attitudes “...rival[s] the effects of formal
education,” (Bowler and Donovan, 2002, 371).
It is through this educative function of political activity that a civic culture con-
ducive to stable democratic governance can be sustained, a finding established by
Almond (1963) foundational study on citizen attitudes toward politics. Since Alexis
de Tocqueville’s famous observation that Americans gained their political awareness
from “schools of democracy”–voluntary organizations such as juries and town hall
meetings–classic democratic theorists have focused on this habituation process as
an important variable in stable democratic governance (Barber, 1984; Budge, 1996).
Thus, when governing interventions expand the inclusiveness of a political regime by
incorporating more citizens into the political process, they facilitate the development
of democratic citizens and a vibrant civic culture capable of sustaining democracy for
the long-term. By contrast, when governing interventions limit the inclusiveness of
the political process, they retard progress in developing democratic citizens and stunt
the development of civic culture because citizens are not habituated into a democratic
ethos.
Take the example developed by Pattie et al. (2004) who argue that the changing
nature of the relationship between citizen and state in Britain has long-term conse-
quences for political attitudes and engagement of British citizens. The authors show
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that citizens in Britain feel that their political system is unresponsive and inefficient
and use this empirical finding to argue that individuals withdrawal from political ac-
tivities because they perceive the political process as voluntary rather than obligatory,
yielding little value for the course of their daily lives. While focused on somewhat
different factors, such an argument is functionally equivalent to the procedural effect
I stress here: individuals’ perceptions of the fairness and effectiveness of the polit-
ical process structures the costs and benefits for participation in certain forms of
political activity. When the political process is viewed as biased or ineffective, indi-
viduals express dissatisfaction and should resort to non-participation or participation
in non-traditional democratic activities to articulate their political demands. When
the process is perceived to be fair, individuals have an incentive to participate in
traditional forms of political activity because it is through these channels that pref-
erences are articulated, aggregated, and considered in the conduct of government.
By altering the inclusiveness of a democratic system, governing assistance sanctioned
by international organizations can shape individual and collective attitudes toward
democracy and structure the incentives and opportunities for individuals to partici-
pate in political activity.
Procedural Effects through Contestability
Democracy is more than inclusiveness, however. In addition to the ways that inter-
national governing assistance can affect who is included in the political process, it
can also affect the range of permissible methods of opposition, public contestation, or
public competition over the conduct of government. Theoretically the concepts are
distinct; as Dahl notes “...in the absence of the right to oppose the right to ‘partic-
ipate’ is stripped of a very large part of the significance it has in a country where
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public contestation exists,” (Dahl, 1973, 5). Without effective channels of contesta-
tion, participation becomes devoid of its democratic value.
Contestation according to Dahl consists of the first three institutional guarantees
for polyarchy: That citizens should have the right to 1) formulate their preferences,
2) signify these preferences to fellow citizens and government through individual and
collective action, and 3) have these preferences weighted equally in the conduct of
government (Coppedge et al., 2008). Using these criteria as benchmarks, it becomes
clear that the institutions associated with international governing assistance can also
affect the channels of contestation in a domestic context, and often through the same
changes that affect the inclusiveness of a political regime. Though the empirical chap-
ters provide a more complete account, I now offer some examples of the ways that
inclusion and contestation can be both expanded and limited by the institutions as-
sociated with governing interventions. The examples provided here use international
election monitoring and international lending, the governing interventions that con-
stitute the empirical chapters, for maximum theoretical clarity.
Election Monitoring
The European Union Handbook on Electoral Observation Missions (Commission,
2008) notes that one of the functions of the electoral observation mission is to ensure
that elections are conducted according to the legally-binding provisions of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which states that “Every
citizen shall have the right...without unreasonable restrictions...to vote and be elected
at genuine periodic elections, which shall be universal and equal suffrage and shall
be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors”
(ICCPR, 1966, Article 25). This mandate requires that all citizens be enfranchised
and that there are no unreasonable restrictions on access to voting. In an effort to ful-
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fill this mandate, the EU and other electoral monitoring organizations regularly send
technical assistance before national elections to help with voter registration, consult
on the locations of polling stations for ease of voter access, and manage information
campaigns to bring awareness to the election and the right to participate (Commis-
sion, 2008). The technical assistance is intended to maximize inclusion in national
elections by lowering the costs of voting for individuals who otherwise may not.
However, technical assistance is not a part of every observation mission. Yet even
in the absence of technical assistance, electoral monitoring still expands democratic
inclusion. If we assume that the act of voting is a rational calculus where individuals
vote when the benefits are greater than the costs, the monitoring activities make
voting a more valuable proposition for individuals. Electoral monitoring missions are
deployed with the goal of monitoring the electoral process to ensure its integrity. Hyde
(2007) provides some evidence to indicate that missions are effective in this regard,
reducing fraud in observed polling stations in Armenia by approximately six percent.
The implication of this finding is that results from monitored polling stations more
closely reflect the will of the electorate and thus, the group of individual voters. In
such circumstances, the prospect of voting is more attractive because votes matter
for the electoral outcome more so than in an election riddled with fraud.
Thus, electoral monitoring works to enhance the inclusiveness of the democratic
process directly by providing technical assistance to states aimed at encouraging
participation from citizens. Monitoring also enhances inclusiveness by making voting
a more beneficial political activity for individuals through their monitoring activities.
In these ways, electoral monitoring reinforces existing democratic institutions in the
state and should generally yield positive payoffs for democratic involvement.
As to contestation, the act of observing electoral activity to reduce fraud is a
mechanism to ensure that citizens preferences are weighted equally. Fraudulent elec-
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tions are not authentically contestable by citizens because even if majority preference
is against the candidate perpetrating electoral fraud, the electoral results often will
not change without other significant collective action. Monitoring electoral activities
increases the costs of electoral manipulation and creates a mechanism to identify and
publicly denounce fraud. In this way, it enhances the contestability of the electoral
process.
International Lending
Governing assistance can also limit inclusiveness such that previously enfranchised
groups are excluded from the political process. One criticism of international lending
has been the degree to which it excludes citizens from the policymaking process
due to structural adjustment policies required to obtain loan funds (Stiglitz, 2002).
Greece, for example, recently experienced a painful recession that required emergency
lending from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union. The
two institutions agreed to a deal worth approximately 150 billion USD, but required
substantial austerity measures as a condition of receiving the loan funds (IMF, 2010).
These austerity measures included raising taxes, cutting wages for public workers,
reducing spending on public services, and cutting welfare benefits. Though mandated
by the terms of the IMF loan, these measures were extremely unpopular in Greece
and spurred widespread protests, labor strikes, and political discontent across the
state. Moreover, the policies were not proposed by elected representatives, but by
the co-lenders, totally eliminating the role of citizens in the conduct of government.
For these reasons, Greek citizens have been very ineffective in changing the course
of policies. As Kapur and Naim (2005) argue, IMF lending programs often build an
alternative chain of accountability in borrower states, where leaders become account-
able to IMF officials instead of their constituents. This is true of Greece, which has
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resulted in leaders being unresponsive to citizen demands. During the most recent
round of national elections, Greek citizens elevated a previously marginal left-wing
party that opposed the austerity measures, Syriza, to the main opposition party with
27 percent of the popular vote. However, the results of the election changed very
little substantively and the austerity measures continue to be implemented by Greek
officials (Donadio, 2012).
Through this imposed accountability, the lending program in Greece and those
that are structurally similar to it remove the mechanism that makes the conduct of
government responsive to citizen preferences, one of the eight institutional guarantees
theorized by Dahl as being necessary (but not sufficient) for democratic governance.
The implication is that inclusion in the political system while a lending program
is in progress is a less effective mechanism of altering the conduct of government
than before the intervention. In this way, lending programs can render political
participation ineffective for individuals, which undermines democracy in the state.
On contestation, the Greek example is one of many where strong public sentiment
against IMF policies has existed while the policies remained in place. By making
elected officials responsible to IMF authority instead of their constituency, the insti-
tutions associated with IMF lending compete with domestic democratic institutions
and undermine the opportunities for contestation in the political process.
For example, in early 2012 before it was clear that a pro-EU/IMF bailout govern-
ment could be formed in Greece, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Scha¨uble sug-
gested that a provisional government appointed by officials with the lenders should
assume control of Greece for two years to implement the structural adjustment pro-
gram concomitant to the bailout. For these and other reasons, Scha¨uble is detested by
the public in Greece; so much so that before he made a visit in June 2013, the Greek
government banned political demonstrations in central Athens. Roads and subway
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stations were systematically blocked to restrict access to common city demonstration
sites and 4,000 officers were deployed to contain any episodes.
Thus, there is anecdotal evidence that governing assistance can exert procedural
effects that alter individual attitudes and behaviors by affecting the inclusiveness and
contestability of the political process. I expect that when governing assistance alters
the domestic institutional context to be more inclusive with more opportunities for
political contestation, individual levels of confidence in democracy will improve and
rates of participation in traditional forms of political activity, like voting, will increase
because the process is perceived as being more legitimate and because the traditional
democratic channels are more responsive to citizen demands.
When governing assistance alters the domestic institutional context by limiting
inclusion or narrowing the range of permissible channels of contestation, individual
levels of confidence in democracy will deteriorate and rates of participation in con-
tentious forms of political activity will increase. This is because by hindering inclusion
and contestation, individuals perceive the political process less favorably than before
governing assistance and because the democratic institutions that they normally use
to articulate political demands become less responsive. Contentious forms of political
activity like riots, boycotts, and protests become the most effective ways to affect the
conduct of government when traditional channels of contestation are marginalized.
In this project, I focus only on the behavioral changes stemming from these ef-
fects. This is for two primary reasons. First, political attitudes are essential to
the consolidation of democratic governance. As demonstrated by an important cor-
pus of research, successful democracy depends on having a population that believes
in democracy as a form of government and that democracy, despite its procedural
sluggishness, is normatively superior to other forms of government. For this reason,
understand the causes and consequences of individual changes in political attitudes is
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important. Second, though the theory elaborated here does make specific empirical
predictions about changes in individual behaviors, such a project given the state of
the theoretical development in this particular area would be premature.
Symbolic Effects
Governing interventions directly affect political involvement through not only pro-
cedural mechanisms as described previously, but through symbolic mechanisms as
well. As Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer (2010, 2012) have argued, the institutional
context in a political system engenders the norms and ideals of that society, and citi-
zens learn about these by engaging with their particular institutional context. When
states adopt institutions that make the political process more inclusive and transpar-
ent, that sends symbolic messages to citizens about the government’s commitment
to democracy which can affect individual perceptions of the system without neces-
sarily exerting any procedural changes to the democratic process. In other words,
symbolic effects create changes in political attitudes and behaviors by appealing to
values, ideals, and emotions, without necessarily exerting any effect whatsoever on
political procedure.
As one example, Kelley (2008) argues that states transitioning to democracy in-
vite electoral monitors to legitimize their electoral process on the global stage. One
implication of this is that states use the act of inviting an electoral monitor as a signal
that their elections will be transparent and free of fraud. This signal serves not only
to elicit legitimacy from the international community, but from constituents in the
state as well, about the quality of the electoral process. The invitation of electoral
monitors is symbolic in this sense: it expresses a government’s commitment, however
authentic, to comply with the prevailing democratic norms and ideals related to free
and fair elections. Though these symbolic effects are more difficult to empirically iso-
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late and measure, they can “...trigger emotive responses from citizens that can draw
them into electoral politics,” (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2012, 15).
This effect can work in the opposite direction, too, however. The adoption of
an IMF lending program strongly signals to citizens that the government has been
inept in its management of the economy. Moreover, adopting institutions that exclude
citizens from the decision-making process sends a signal that the preferences of citizens
are unimportant in the management of crises and that democratic governance is a
temporary, not permanent, feature of the political landscape in which citizens live.
The empirical chapters intentionally focus primarily on the direct procedural effect
and indirect effects as being the primary causal mechanisms in the argument. There
is more and better data about these two types of effects, and these data can be used
to more credibly support my theory. However, I do occasionally refer to anecdotal
evidence indicating the plausibility of a symbolic effect for citizens.
Indirect Effects of Governing Assistance on Political Involvement
The theoretical argument to this point has emphasized the direct channels through
which governing assistance may affect individual perceptions of democracy and rates
of participation in certain types of political activity. The institutions associated with
governing assistance may also indirectly influence these characteristics by affecting
political outcomes in a state. Changes in the inclusiveness and contestability of the
political process can alter political outcomes in a state, thereby influencing levels of
confidence in democracy and incentives to participate in particular forms of political
activity.
This indirect effect is difficult to keep theoretically separate from the direct ef-
fects described above. The primary difference between them is from where the effects
originate. In the case of the direct effects, both the procedural and symbolic effect
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originate from the changes in the domestic institutional context caused by the govern-
ing intervention. In the case of the indirect effect, it originates from the changes in
political outcomes generated by an altered institutional context.
To clarify, imagine a political system where both the institutional context and
political outcomes could be manipulated by researchers. In the first iteration of such
a system, the researcher deploys a governing intervention that creates a more inclusive
and contestable political process. Through this process, political outcomes are altered
in favor of previously disenfranchised populations from what they would have been
under the original domestic institutional context, pre-intervention. In this case, both
direct effects and the indirect effect would be at work; the direct effect yielding from
the more inclusive and contestable political process and the indirect effect yielding
from the outcomes changing in favor of previously disenfranchised political groups.
Now imagine the same theoretical experiment with the same governing interven-
tion creating a more inclusive and contestable political process. But in this case, the
political outcomes generated by the altered domestic institutional context are identical
to the outcomes that would have been generated by the pre-intervention institutional
context. In this case, only the direct effects (procedural and symbolic) could possibly
be affecting individual democratic attitudes and behaviors. For the indirect effect to
alter individual political involvement, there must be changes in political outcomes.
Obviously we cannot exert such fine-tuned control in the real world. However,
the thought exercise proposed above is useful insofar as it theoretically distinguishes
the types of effects I expect to find in cases of governing interventions in democratic
states. Moreover, though we can never know for certain, it seems reasonable to
assume that changes in the inclusiveness and contestability of political systems would
very frequently generate changes in political outcomes that lead to the indirect effects
described here.
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Referring to the empirical examples briefly discussed above, electoral monitoring
seeks to ensure the transparency and fairness of national elections. Through this pro-
cess, electoral monitors affect procedural democracy by ensuring that the opportunity
to participate is unrestricted and that candidates genuinely compete for support. 3
However, the presence of electoral monitors potentially affects political outcomes, as
well. For example, through its monitoring activities, the electoral observation mission
may create conditions where an opposition candidate could be elected to office who
otherwise would not have. This political outcome may have been highly unlikely in
the absence of the governing assistance. Thus, the intervention of interest initiated
changes in the domestic political context that not only affect procedural aspects of
the democratic process, but also the outcomes it generates.
Similarly, international lending frequently changes political outcomes, especially
as they relate to economic and fiscal policy in states. Elected officials in Greece, as
noted above, have committed their administrations to complying with the structural
adjustment policies required by the EU/IMF bailout agreement, despite widespread
unpopularity and criticism from large portions of the Greek population. In cases
of international lending, the program’s effects on political outcomes are often highly
visible and a source of contention among competing political factions in the state.
There is one further distinction between direct and indirect effects that merits
attention. Through the indirect effect, it is possible that even when the political
process is made more inclusive and contestable by a governing intervention, that in-
dividual attitudes toward democracy and participation in democratic activities could
deteriorate. In the way of a brief example, consider a case where an election mon-
itor makes the electoral process more transparent and more fair, but through this
3It is acknowledged that some states invite electoral monitors and still cheat in the electoral
process. I take up this argument in more detail in Chapter 4.
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transparency discovers and makes public an incumbent’s attempt to manipulate the
electoral process. Though the democratic process was reinforced (insofar as it became
more inclusive and contestable), the outcome for individual political involvement is
potentially negative, because individuals receive information that their political lead-
ers are corrupt. This example is further elaborated in Chapter 4.
Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter has articulated a general theory for understanding how and when
governing assistance provided by international organizations will affect the democratic
stability of states. The theory focuses on the micro-behavioral foundations of demo-
cratic stability in that it seeks to causally link governing interventions with changed
in individual political attitudes and behaviors. The theory also sets expectations for
empirical outcomes that are the focus of subsequent chapters.
In very general terms, the theory presented here conceptualizes democracy along
two dimensions; inclusiveness and contestability. Inclusiveness refers to the propor-
tion of the population in a state that is free to participate in the political process.
Contestability refers to the opportunities for individuals to contest the conduct of gov-
ernment. I argue that when international organizations provide governing assistance
to states, it is possible to assess whether the institutions associated with the governing
assistance enhance or restrict the state’s institutional context along these dimensions.
Further, I argue that how the governing assistance restricts of enhances democracy
along these dimensions suggests the empirical effects most likely to manifest at the
individual level.
When governing assistance alters the domestic institutional context such that it
enhances inclusiveness and opportunities for contestation, I expect that individuals
will generally express higher levels of confidence in democracy and higher rates of
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participation in traditional democratic activities. This is because individuals proce-
dural and symbolic changes catalyzed by the governing assistance leads individuals to
perceive the democratic process as more inclusive, more transparent, and more equi-
table in generating political outcomes. Further, individuals may experience emotive
responses to democratic changes in the political process that signal their government’s
commitment to transparency and good governance. Finally, through these changes
to the domestic political context, political outcomes may be altered in favor of pre-
viously disenfranchised populations, which should lead to increased satisfaction with
the performance of government.
42
When governing assistance alters the domestic institutional context by restricting
inclusiveness and opportunities for contestation, the opposite effects should be ob-
served. Individuals should generally express lower levels of confidence in government
and should participate at higher rates in contentious forms of political activity, as
these are the most effective channels for articulating political demands when demo-
cratic institutions are unresponsive.
Chapter three uses cross-national survey data to to substantiate the statistical
relationship between international election monitoring, a governing intervention that
I argue expands inclusiveness and opportunities for contestation in a state, and in-
dividual political involvement. Chapter four uses data to explore the opposite type
of intervention, one that restricts inclusiveness and opportunities for contestation, by
looking at international lending programs in a cross-national context.
To help substantiate the causal mechanisms articulated by the theory, chapter
five conducts two case studies that provide additional qualitative and quantitative
evidence that linkages between international governing interventions and individual
political attitudes and behaviors exist. Chapter six summarizes the results and con-
cludes by providing some suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 3
ELECTORAL MONITORING IN A CROSS-NATIONAL CONTEXT
Monitoring democratic elections is an important and widely practiced norm in
developing democracies around the globe. As Hyde notes, while election monitoring
is a relatively new phenomenon, by the year 2004 at least 80 percent of national
elections in developing states were observed by an international election monitor
(Hyde, 2007, 38). This trend is substantively important for democratic governance,
for the effects of election monitoring should matter for the quality and transparency
of the electoral process. More generally, given the ubiquity of electoral monitoring
in transitional democracies, it is important to understand the implications of having
monitoring missions present as independent third parties in the electoral process.
To this point, research on international election monitoring has focused on its
effects on electoral fraud and manipulation by domestic political actors. Hyde (2007),
for example, finds that the presence of international election observers at polling
places decreased election-day fraud by approximately six percent. At the macro-
level, Kelley (2008) investigates the rise of electoral monitoring as an international
norm, including the puzzling question of why states would invite an electoral monitor,
yet still manipulate the electoral process. In more recent work, Kelley (2010) has
investigated the biases of electoral monitoring organizations and the conditions under
which the official assessments certify or denounce election results. In short, most
research to this point has focused on the organizations that monitor elections and
the state targets of these monitoring missions. While this focus on the organizational
and state levels has yielded important insights into the effects of electoral monitoring
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missions, this project takes a different approach by investigating relationship between
electoral monitoring and individual political attitudes and behaviors.
Such a focus is important because electoral monitoring missions are intended to
detect and sanction fraud and manipulation in the electoral process such that the
political preferences of voters are fairly considered (Carothers, 1997; Chand, 1997;
Anglin, 1998). In other words, electoral monitoring missions are intended to ensure
the transparency and fairness of the electoral process by certifying that in the presence
of monitors, no major irregularities were detected. In doing so, electoral monitoring
missions convey messages to citizens that the democratic process was a true and
accurate expression of popular political will. But do these functions and signals have
any effect on individual political attitudes?
The next section briefly reviews literature on the relationship between political in-
stitutions and individual political attitudes and behaviors as well as relevant literature
about electoral monitoring missions in order to provide the appropriate context for
the present theoretical approach. The third section applies the theoretical framework
described in Chapter 2 to generate hypotheses about the relationship between interna-
tional electoral monitoring and individual political involvement and posits hypotheses
related to changes in political attitudes for individuals in states with monitored ex-
ecutive elections. The third section also proposes some alternative explanations for
changes in levels of individual political involvement independent of the variables mea-
suring electoral monitoring. I then test these hypotheses in a cross-national context
to show that individuals have increased confidence in democracy and higher rates of
participation in voting in states where elections are monitored and certified. Where
elections are monitored and the results are denounced or ambiguous, individuals re-
port lower levels of confidence in democracy and are less likely to vote. This chapter’s
primary contribution is to present cross-national statistical evidence linking election
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monitoring to predictable changes in individual attitudes toward democracy and rates
of participation in the traditional democratic activities.
Institutions and Micro-Level Political Attitudes
Scholarly interest in the relationship between political institutions and individual
political attitudes and behaviors has led to several important findings. Relatively
early in this tradition, Anderson and Guillory (1997) asked whether and how po-
litical institutions mattered for satisfaction with democracy. They concluded that
differences in the type of electoral system matter for individual levels of satisfaction
with democratic outcomes. When an individual politically identifies with an electoral
winner, levels of satisfaction were maximized in majoritarian systems. When an in-
dividual identifies with an electoral loser, those in consensus-based political systems
expressed higher levels of satisfaction than individuals in majoritarian systems due to
the incorporating features of consensus-based democratic institutions. Beyond these
specific conclusions, these findings showed more generally that political institutions
matter for understanding the formation of political attitudes and the reasons that
individuals engage in political activity. Since then, this conclusion has been substan-
tiated by an impressive body of scholarship (Jones, 1999; Lijphart, 1999; Taylor, 2000;
Norris, 2004; Machado et al., 2011; Fumagalli and Narciso, 2012, inter alia).
To this point, the focus of research in this traditions has been almost exclusively
on the relationship between domestic political institutions and individual political
involvement. However, international institutions are present not only in the interna-
tional system, but also in the domestic political systems of many states as they are
relied on to provide governance when states require assistance doing so (Chabal, 2002;
Laakso, 2002). As such, there are important lessons to learn by studying the linkages
between international institutions and individual political involvement using what is
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already known about the relationship between domestic institutions and individu-
als as a conceptual guide. In some ways, the theoretical expectations in both cases
should be similar. Institutions are forces that constrain the range of permissible po-
litical activity. The set of choices available to individuals will be different depending
on the institutional context structuring their political system. In other words, when
international and domestic institutions structure political systems similarly, political
outcomes should be similar, too.
However, there are also major differences between domestic and international in-
stitutions which potentially affect the nature of these relationships. Most obviously,
international institutions and their associated governing interventions are temporary,
non-enduring features of domestic political systems. Once a international election
monitor issues its final report, the monitoring mission ends and the monitors leave
the country. More generally, governing assistance programs tend to share this charac-
teristic. Rather than conceiving of these institutions as near-constant and permanent
fixtures in a political system as domestic political institutions are commonly con-
ceived (March and Olsen, 2006), it is appropriate to consider the temporary nature
of these international institutions and assess whether this characteristic matters for
the effects they may exert on individuals.
The dependent variables in this chapter measure individual levels of satisfaction
with democracy. Such a focus is warranted for several reasons. Primarily, confidence
in democracy is considered a necessary condition to the sustenance and consolidation
of democratic governance in developing states (Putnam et al., 1994; Dahl, 1997; In-
glehart, 1997, 2000). By focusing on the ways that international institutions affect
confidence in this regard, the findings of this research have implications for demo-
cratic stability in developing democracies around the globe. Further, the focus on
confidence in particular democratic institutions is used as a measure of political atti-
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tudes because of the availability of cross-national survey data and because, as noted
by Newton, “...confidence in institutions is about something deeper and more fun-
damental than trust in politicians or in particular governments,” (Newton, 2001, 5).
Confidence in institutions is a proxy for satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the existing
political system and its outputs.
The findings of this chapter provide information about the long-term prospects for
democratic governance in developing states. More importantly, they show that gov-
erning assistance provided by international organization is not ex ante good or bad for
states. Rather, how the institutions concomitant to the governing assistance interact
with the state’s existing institutional context determines the effect it will have for
democracy in the state. For this reason, the design of governing assistance programs
matters for whether they ultimately enhance or undermine governing stability and the
process of democratic consolidation. As further elaborated below, election monitor-
ing is one form of governing assistance whose institutions typically reinforce existing
democratic institutions in a state. Therefore, the expectation is that election moni-
toring should generally exert positive effects on individual political involvement (with
some caveats to be discussed). These results show that international organizations
can be a positive force for helping democratizing states around the globe by eliciting
support for democracy and encouraging participation in traditional democratic activ-
ity. More generally, the findings indicate the need to take governing assistance and
international institutions seriously when examining the sources of individual political
attitudes and activation.
Electoral Monitoring and Confidence in Democracy
How does the theory articulated in Chapter 2 causally link international election
monitoring to changes in individual political attitudes and behaviors? Recall that
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the expectations for changes in individual political involvement are generated by
assessing whether the institutions associated with governing assistance reinforce or
suppress the existing democratic institutions in a state. In the case of international
election monitoring, I argue that this type of governing assistance generally reinforces
existing democratic institutions in states where it is deployed.
In more precise terms, election monitoring reinforces existing democratic institu-
tions in several ways. First, election monitoring makes the electoral process more
transparent and makes voting a more beneficial political act for individuals. The
direct procedural effect, in which individual political attitudes and behaviors are af-
fected by changes to the political process, exerts itself most directly. This effect could
also be described as a “rationalist” effect, insofar as the presence of the governing
assistance alters the costs and benefits of political action (Shepsle, 2006; Weingast,
1996). Electoral monitoring helps to shape the incentives not only for individual
voters, but for incumbent and opposition political candidates seeking (re)election, as
well.
For example, at the individual level, international election monitoring helps to
increase the efficacy of any individual vote, because a vote counted fairly is worth more
than a vote in an election where the outcome is manipulated (He, 2006; Kandelaki,
2006). Even if electoral fraud is not eliminated by the presence of monitors, so long
as the presence of the monitors improves the fairness of the election, this effect should
hold. Furthermore, the effect even improves the hypothetical “value” of votes when
an individual plans to vote for the party that manipulates the electoral process. In the
case of a fraudulent election, their vote is effectively meaningless because it is fraud,
and not individual votes, that determines the outcome of the election (cf. Diamond
(2002, 32)). Thus, when electoral monitoring missions work as designed and reduce
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the amount of electoral fraud in a state, it makes voting a more beneficial undertaking
for individuals.
The direct procedural effect also operates in the context of electoral strategy. In
the case of an observed election where the costs of electoral manipulation increase,
persuading voters through more traditional mechanisms becomes more beneficial as
an electoral strategy for competing political parties. As a result, incumbents and
opposition candidates may be more willing to adopt the policy preferences of the
electorate in order to win their vote (Adams and Merrill, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita
and Smith, 2011). In other words, the presence of electoral monitors may prompt
politicians to be more responsive to the policy demands of the electorate than they
otherwise would be since winning votes through policy concessions may be a better
electoral strategy than attempting to cheat. These changes should prompt individuals
to feel more confident in the electoral institutions in their state and the quality of
democracy overall given that they have the ability to choose from meaningful political
alternatives and that the outputs of government are benefiting them.
The direct procedural effect alters the strategies for competing political candi-
dates, as well. As argued above, if an electoral monitoring mission works as designed
and creates incentives for political candidates to play by the rules, voters ultimately
benefit because the incumbent and political opposition will have to resort to more
traditional voter targeting methods instead of electoral manipulation. In other words,
electoral monitors raise the costs for cheating such that incumbents and opposition
candidates will seek to persuade voters through alternative mechanisms. Addition-
ally, the costs of cheating increase in the presence of electoral monitors because of
the potential ramifications if caught (Hyde and Marinov, 2007). Due to the rise of
electoral monitoring as an international norm for developing states (Kelley, 2008),
when an election is judged to be “ambiguous” or “unfair,” the state and its leaders
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not only suffer losses in domestic legitimacy, but also international legitimacy because
electoral monitors convey a highly visible and credible signal to the rest of the world
that the state is not abiding by democratic principles.
Although these rational effects are the most obvious mechanisms through which
election monitoring may alter patterns in political attitudes and behaviors, another
possible mechanism through which electoral monitoring may operate is through the
direct symbolic effects of these institutions. The direct symbolic effect refers to the
emotive responses of individuals catalyzed by the messages states send by adopting
particular features into its institutional context. As Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer ar-
gue, “...political institutions do more than afford rational incentives for participation
but also symbolize a country’s most important ideals for the democratic process,”
(Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2010, 990).
Electoral monitoring missions come at the explicit invitation of a state and are
not necessarily allocated according to where electoral fraud is most likely. Therefore,
when a state’s electoral commission formally invites an international organization
to observe its national elections, this acts as a signaling device to citizens. The
invitation sends a message to citizens that the government is committed to democracy,
that transparency and inclusion in the political process are important, and that free
and fair elections are vital to sustaining legitimate government. For this reason,
individuals may feel more incorporated into their political systems and may feel more
politically effective since the government is ostensibly taking steps to prevent electoral
manipulation. This particular argument is complicated somewhat by the finding that
states sometimes invite election monitors and still cheat (Kelley, 2008; Beaulieu and
Hyde, 2009), but the act of inviting an organization to monitor domestic elections
conveys a pro-democratic message even if the behaviors of particular governments
does not always comport with such an ideal.
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Furthermore, it seems likely that political leaders recognize the importance of this
signaling device for their domestic elections. A common assumption about political
leaders is that their primary motivation is to stay in office (Bueno de Mesquita et al.,
2001). If this is true, then there must be a rational payoff for a leader to invite an
organization to observe domestic elections, even when that leader intends to manip-
ulate the electoral process. The payoff, it seems, is that having observed elections
sends signals of credibility to both domestic and international audiences about the
legitimacy of the electoral process. Thus, though these symbolic effects are difficult
to empirically isolate, they are likely important determinants of individual political
attitudes and behaviors.
Finally, there are indirect effects resulting from changes in political outcomes in
the presence of governing assistance. I argued above that the presence of electoral
monitors affects the strategies that political candidates will use to elicit support, as
electoral manipulation becomes a less attractive strategy. The precise outcomes are
difficult to specify, ex ante, but the increased responsiveness of political candidates
to individual political demands should yield positive payoffs in the form of policy
concessions.
For example, the 2008 Presidential election in Ghana became a race between
two competing candidates Nana Akufo-Addo of the ruling New Patriotic Party and
John Atta Mills of the National Democratic Congress. The 2008 Ghanaian election
occurred in the midst of discovering vast national oil resources (BBC April 8, 2008).
The campaign between these two candidates was almost entirely about how these
resources would be best spent on the Ghanaian public, and which party would do
the most to reduce corruption and cronyism. Despite the fact that oil revenue was
not expected until late 2010, candidates campaigned with particular attention to the
demands individuals and regions made on these oil revenues and made exceptional
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promises to deliver goods and services to regions that were habitually underserviced.
Promises to deliver schools, roads, and updated infrastructure ultimately became the
issues that citizens cared about and the ones that candidates routinely used to elicit
support while on the campaign trail.
The National Democratic Congress several times made claims of electoral manipu-
lation on the part of the New Patriotic Party. However, because the European Union
was present in the country to monitor the electoral process, these claims of fraudulent
activity were never substantiated and did not become major issues in the campaign.
Furthermore, in a surprising twist, despite the fact that Akufo-Addo was shown to be
ahead in public opinion polls conducted by the Ghanaian electoral commission, Mills
ultimately won the election in a second-round runoff with 50.7 percent of the vote.
The presence of election monitors in this case helped keep attention on the issues in
the campaign, including how the newly discovered oil revenue would be managed and
spent. In this way, it required the major political candidates to take these issues se-
riously that otherwise may have been neglected in a context where claims of electoral
manipulation could have become a more central campaign issue.
It is through these two sets of mechanisms that individual-level attitudes and be-
haviors may be impacted by the presence of international election monitors. Election
monitors reinforce existing democratic institutions such that they operate more ef-
fectively by raising the costs for electoral manipulation and helping to ensure that
political parties and candidates play by the rules of the game. More subtly, the in-
vitation and presence of election monitors vests citizens with a sense of inclusion in
the democratic process where their votes matter for determining their political fates.
It is unlikely that these effects apply uniformly to democratic states, however.
There are at least three confounding factors that potentially affect whether or not
electoral monitors influence attitudes and behaviors at the individual level. First is
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the credibility and extent of the electoral monitoring mission; second is the monitoring
organization’s final judgment on the electoral process in the state; third is the degree
of democratic consolidation in the target state.
Electoral Monitors
The task of monitoring international elections is not the domain of a single in-
ternational organization. Rather, there are several international organizations, both
governmental and non-governmental that perform these tasks. These organizations
vary in the transparency of their operations, the public awareness and visibility of
their monitoring missions, and their reputations for rendering unbiased assessments.
A certain number of organizations have been deemed “credible” by previous research
for their histories of good performance in this area, and these are the organizations
that are frequently invited to observe domestic elections (Kelley, 2009). There are
other organizations that have reputations for being politically biased, but provide a
useful service to governments seeking validation of their fraudulent electoral process to
elicit international legitimacy (Beaulieu and Hyde, 2009). The mechanisms posited
above should most strongly affect individuals when the monitoring organization is
considered credible and is generally trusted to undertake the task of monitoring a
domestic election without strong political biases. When the organization is not cred-
ible, it is very possible that the effects disappear entirely or even reverse. Such an
investigation is beyond the scope of this study. The present analysis attempts to
avoid this issue by limiting the empirical portion of this paper to only those monitor-
ing organizations considered to be credible by previous research and by their track
records in monitoring elections worldwide.
Election monitoring missions also vary with regard to the size and extent of the
missions (Kelley, 2010). Some missions provide only technical assistance, such as
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registering voters and choosing the location of polling places before the election oc-
curs. Other monitoring missions provide pre-electoral assistance, but also provide
election-day assistance in the form of volunteers to observe the electoral process at
polling stations around the country. Larger and more extensive missions should be
more effective at detecting fraud in the electoral process and therefore makes the
electoral process more transparent than a smaller monitoring mission. Additionally,
the mere presence of monitors at a polling place may act as a visible signal to citizens
that the electoral process is being fairly conducted. In general, then, the theoretical
expectation is that the larger and more extensive an electoral monitoring missions is,
the more acute the effects will be for individuals.
As important as the credibility of the monitoring organization is the organization’s
judgment of the electoral process in the state. When a credible organization denounces
a national election as ambiguous or fraudulent, individuals may lose confidence in the
democratic process because of the highly public nature of the electoral fraud claims
(Hyde and Marinov, 2007). Further, fraudulent elections have a tendency to result in
political instability and in extreme cases, violent conflict, because the opposing sides
make competing claims about the integrity of the electoral process (Lehoucq, 2003;
Magaloni, 2010). In extreme cases, such as in Kenya after its 2007 national election,
this instability can result in civilian deaths and civil conflict which has created a
fragile political situation that remained long after the election was held (Cheeseman,
2008; Mueller, 2008). Thus, when credible monitors certify an election as free and
fair, the effects posited above should hold. When the organization rules that the
electoral process was ambiguous or fraudulent, individuals may lose confidence in the
democratic process given the high-profile and public manner in which the fraud was
detected and reported.
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Finally, the level of democracy in a state matters, too, because in consolidated
democracies, the effects of these temporary political institutions may be negligible,
or even opposite of what they are in transitional democratic governments. Consider
the case of electoral monitoring in the United States in the most recent presidential
election. Representatives from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Eu-
rope (OSCE) opened a formal electoral monitoring mission for the United States 2012
federal elections at the request of “authorities of the United States,” (OSCE, 2012).
In response, the Attorneys General of Texas and Iowa threatened the observers with
legal recourse should they show up to polling places (Palmer, 2012). While this is
only anecdotal evidence that the causal linkages between international institutions
are different in differing democratic contexts, it is reasonable to assume that consol-
idated democracies may not need to send strong signals about the legitimacy of the
government and as a result, these governments may interpret intrusions into domes-
tic democratic processes from a different perspective than transitioning democratic
states. These mechanisms do not operate identically where democratic governance is
consolidated and where elections are generally considered to be free and fair. Rather,
it is where democracy is fragile that these effects should be most acute.
From this theoretical framework, I develop the following hypothesis that will serve
as the basis for the empirical analysis in the following sections:
H1 Pre- to post-electoral changes in individual levels of satisfaction with democracy
will be highest in states where the electoral process was certified as “acceptable”
by an international electoral monitoring organization, all else equal.
H2 Individuals in states with the largest missions (adjusted for population) will
report the greatest increases in levels of confidence in democracy, all else equal.
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H3 Individuals in states with monitored elections are more likely to report an in-
tention to vote that those in states with unmonitored elections, all else equal.
There are, of course, alternative explanations that merit investigation as well.
Primarily, satisfaction with democracy has been theoretically linked to perceptions of
economic performance (Lipset, 1959; Hofferbert and Klingemann, 1999). When indi-
vidual perceive economic performance to be strong, they are more likely to express
satisfaction and confidence in their political system than when the reverse is true.
Therefore, changes in public opinion may be initiated by changes in macroeconomic
performance and may have nothing at all to do with the process of electoral observa-
tion. Thus, I the following hypothesis is considered as an alternative explanation:
H2 Pre- to post-electoral changes in individual levels of satisfaction with democ-
racy are best explained by a state’s change economic performance over the same
period.
Finally, although there is little variation in levels of democracy between the states
in the sample used in the present analysis, prima facie, there may be a more nuanced
statistical relationship that is not immediately evident. Therefore, I test one addi-
tional alternative explanation related to the level of democracy in a state with the
following hypothesis:
H3 Pre- to post-electoral changes in individual levels of satisfaction with democracy
are best explained by a state’s change in democracy over the same period.
Data and Methods
To investigate whether international electoral monitoring has significant effects on
individual attitudes toward democracy and democratic institutions, I rely on Lati-
nobarometer public opinion data from six Latin American executive elections held
57
between 2001 and 2005. 1 All elections in the dataset were monitored by a major
multilateral organization and all monitoring missions came only after the country ex-
tended a formal invitation. I focus on this specific subset of elections for two reasons.
First, by focusing on a particular region of the world, regional variation is minimized
that would otherwise need to be controlled. In this way, the analysis is able to focus
on the electoral monitoring mechanisms themselves while assuming that the units of
analysis constituting the data are reasonably similar. Further, this particular subset
of elections was monitored by large, mainstream organizations and thus focusing on
this subset helps to reduce variability in the quality and type of electoral monitoring
employed in each state. In short, by focusing on this particular region and time, much
of the variation that may otherwise affect the results is minimized.
I first assess whether there are significant differences between pre- and post-
electoral country means for satisfaction in democracy using a method developed by
Kruschke (2013) called Bayesian Estimation Supersedes the t-Test (BEST). This is
a Bayesian implementation of a standard t-test, but has several methodological ad-
vantages for the present purposes. First, the BEST procedure is more conservative
in small sample sizes and does not show significant differences in small sample sizes
where the standard t-test might improperly do so. Second, because the BEST pro-
cedure relies on Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling procedures, multiple
representative posterior distributions can be easily computed to ensure that the re-
sults of the BEST procedure are stable and consistent. Having the ability to assess
the consistency of the findings is key when the difference in means and the effect size
are substantively consequential. In other words, we must not only be confident that
the means are significantly different between pre- and post-electoral attitudes, but
1The particular elections included in the dataset are Bolivia 2002, Colombia 2002, Ecuador 2002,
El Salvador 2004, Guatemala 2003, and Paraguay 2003.
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must also be sure that the size of the difference is accurately estimated. However,
simply assessing that there are significant differences between pre- and post-electoral
country-level means says nothing about the causal factors contributing to this change
in attitudes. In order to better assess the causal relationship between electoral mon-
itoring and individual political attitudes, I rely on predictive Bayesian modeling and
use out-of-sample cross-validation techniques to assess the robustness of each predic-
tive model’s accuracy.
For each country, I use survey data from two time periods: the year prior to and
the year after the election. I use these opinion data to determine whether there are
significant differences between pre- and post-electoral attitudes. After establishing
the existence of significant differences between pre- and post-electoral public opinion
data, I then use the public opinion and electoral monitoring data to construct a
predictive model for post-electoral changes in satisfaction with democracy. To do
this, I randomly divide the survey data into four groups, three with approximately
700 observations each that are used as training data to build three predictive models.
The fourth subset of data is the testing dataset where each of the predictive models
will be tested for predictive accuracy. As Schneider et al writes, “...the academic
goal is the identification of the out-of-sample prediction that offers the most accurate
forecast in comparison to the real outcome,” (Schneider et al., 2011, 7). By reserving
data for testing the competing models, confidence in the predictive value is increased
because the observations that the model is predicting was not used to construct the
predictive models themselves.
The independent variables in the predictive models are measured at the time of
the post-electoral survey data are taken (Latinobarometer 2001; 2002; 2003; 2004;
2005). Each model includes the same individual-level predictors of satisfaction with
democracy, including news readership, self-reported political ideology, education, sex,
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age, whether the individual has personally known an act of corruption in the past
year, how the individual rates the present economic situation of their country, whether
the individual approves of the incumbent administration, the economic well-being of
the individual (measured by how well their income covers their needs), and whether
the individual trusts people in general. Each of these predictors has theoretical jus-
tification for inclusion in the models and I refer the reader to other work for those
explanations (Lipset, 1987; Nye, 1997; Anderson and Singer, 2008; Booth and Selig-
son, 2009; Norris, 2011).
In addition to the individual-level predictors, each of the models includes a single
country-level predictor related to the three hypotheses discussed previously. The data
for these variables comes from data related to the specific electoral monitoring mission
in the election year, (Kelley, 2012) as well as other country-level indicators from the
World Bank and Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010).
The first model uses electoral monitoring as the country-level predictor. The
variable is dichotomous and is coded as “1” for each country that was monitored
by an international organization and where that organization deemed the election
“acceptable” or “free and fair.” Where a state had a monitored election but the
monitoring organization issued a final report declaring the election “ambiguous” or
“unacceptable,” the country-level predictor was coded as “0.” While a rather general
measure of the effects of electoral monitoring in a state, the measure does capture a
theoretically important difference between simply being a monitored or unmonitored
election. The variable as constructed tells us also about the quality of the election,
or at least the quality of the election as determined by the monitoring organization.
Electoral monitoring organizations release public statements, write official reports,
and ultimately make very public signals to the electorate about their judgement of
the electoral process (Beaulieu and Hyde, 2009; Hyde, 2011; Kelley, 2012). By coding
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the outcome of the electoral report, this measure serves as a proxy for the type of
public statements individuals may have been exposed to.
The second model uses the level of democracy as the country-level predictor. The
level of democracy is important because a states fidelity to democratic principles
strongly impinges on levels of citizen satisfaction. As Anderson and Tverdova (2003,
91) argue, “...informal political practices, especially those that compromise important
democratic principles, should be considered important indicators of political system
performance.” More generally, since system performance is strongly related to levels
of satisfaction with government, level of democracy is a substantively predictor at the
country-level. The variable is measured as the state’s Polity IV score in the year the
survey data was collected.
The final model uses economic performance as the country-level predictor. When
economic performance is poor, individuals feel less confident in democracy and demo-
cratic institutions as well as less satisfied with the outputs of the government. The
variable is measured as the change in GDP per capita, adjusted for purchasing power
parity, from the pre-electoral to post-electoral period. Though imperfect, this measure
is appropriate because it most closely assesses the economic conditions of individuals
in a cross-national perspective and is used widely as a measure of access to economic
resources (Anand et al., 1994).
The dependent variable in each model is the individual-level response to a question
about satisfaction with democracy. However, since the focus of this inquiry is on
change and not simply predicting levels of satisfaction at a given point in time,
I transform the dependent variable into a binary variable with a value of “0” if
the individual responded as being satisfied with democracy below the pre-election
country mean. The dependent variable is coded as “1” if the respondent answered as
being satisfied with democracy above the pre-electoral country mean. While this is
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imperfect, is is the most practical solution given that the survey data do not follow
the same respondents from year to year. By coding the dependent variable in this
way, we are able to determine whether there are shifts in satisfaction and where they
are most pronounced.
I use a Bayesian hierarchical logit to estimate the predictive models. The Bayesian
implementation of this model yields several advantages. First, as recently shown by
Stegmueller (2013) the Bayesian model outperforms its frequentist counterpart when
the number of level-two observations is small. In this case, there are six country-level
observations, and the Bayesian model will yield more consistent and reliable esti-
mates. Second, the Bayesian implementation of a statistical model more easily deals
with problems of data missingness, because missing values are treated as unknown
parameters that are sampled from the posterior distribution (Jackman, 2000).
Each of the predictive models is specified with the individual-level intercept as
a function of the country-level predictor. More formally, the individual level of the
model is specified as
µi = αj + βXi + , αj ∼ N(µαj, ταj)
where Xi is the matrix of individual-level predictors and αj is a draw from a random
normal distribution with the mean µαj and precision ταj. These are then calculated
as a function of the country-level predictor as follows
µαj = αL2 + βL2Zj, αL2 ∼ N(0, .0001)
ταj ∼ Γ(1, 1)
where Zj is the matrix of country-level predictors (in each model, Zj is a vector
including a single country-level predictor) and the country-level intercept is a draw
from a random normal distribution with with a mean of 0 and a precision of .0001.
62
All prior values used in this analysis are uninformative and did not affect the results
substantively.
Results
For the six countries in the dataset, the mean pre- and post-electoral levels of
satisfaction with democracy are presented in Table 3.1. All six countries experienced
a monitored executive election between the pre- and post-electoral surveys. Five
out of the six countries experienced increases in the mean level of satisfaction with
democracy while one country (Guatemala) experienced a slight decrease (See Figure
3.1).
Figure 3.1: Mean Satisfaction with Democracy in Monitored Elections
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Table 3.1: Country Averages: Satisfaction with Democracy
Country Pre-election Post-election Difference
Bolivia 1.89 2.01 + 0.12
Colombia 1.71 2.09 + 0.38
Ecuador 1.89 2.06 + 0.17
El Salvador 2.19 2.29 + 0.10
Guatemala 2.22 2.11 – 0.10
Paraguay 1.47 1.75 + 0.28
I first present the results of the BEST estimation to assess whether there were
significant changes between the pre- and post-electoral attitudes for this subset of
countries in Latin America. Figure 3.2 presents samples from representative poste-
rior distributions for the pre-election country means. Before the election, the poste-
riors show that the aggregated country average is approximately 1.8. 2 Figure 3.3
shows samples from representative posterior distributions for the post-electoral coun-
try means. Post-election, the aggregated country average is just above 2.0. Moreover,
as Figure 3.4 shows, the difference between pre- and post-electoral mean satisfaction
with democracy is significant and positive; in this particular subset of elections, in-
dividuals were significantly more satisfied with their democracies after the election
than in the year before it.
2The score of 1.8 is measured on the same four-point scale as the survey question; an answer of “1”
indicates “Not at all satisfied”; “2” indicates “Not very satisfied”; “3” indicates “Fairly satisfied”;
“4” indicates “Very satisfied.”
64
Figure 3.2: Satisfaction with Democracy: Posterior Estimates, Pre-Election
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Figure 3.3: Satisfaction with Democracy: Posterior Estimates, Post-Election
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Figure 3.4: Difference of Means: Pre- and Post-Election
Difference of Means: Pre−election to Post−election
Post−Election Mean Change
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0% < 0 < 100%
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Finding evidence of a significant shift in attitudes is only the first step in the
analysis, however, because there are many alternative mechanisms that could shift
attitudes after an election. One equally plausible explanation is that economic per-
formance, independent of the election itself, is driving changes in individual attitudes
toward democracy. As economic conditions improve, individuals are more likely to
express satisfaction with the outputs of their system (Lipset, 1959; Hofferbert and
Klingemann, 1999). Thus, it is necessary to design and test each of the plausible
explanations to the extent possible in order to determine which explanations are sup-
ported by the empirical patterns identified in the data. That is the methodological
approach taken here.
I use three predictive models to test the three competing hypotheses proposed
above that potentially explain the changes in satisfaction with democracy. Again,
each of the three models includes the same individual-level predictors. Out of those
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individual-level predictors included and across all three models, ideology, economic
well-being, approval of the incumbent, and the individual’s rating of the economic
situation of the country were the strongest predictors of satisfaction with democracy.
Of prime interest here is the direction and magnitude of the country-level rather than
individual-level effects.
The first model includes election monitoring as the country-level predictor. Out
of the six countries in the sample, all had monitored elections that were certified
as “acceptable” with the exception of Guatemala, where the election was considered
“ambiguous.” Each model estimated 300,000 draws from the posterior distribution
using the adaptive Metropolis Hastings sampler and WinBUGS software version 14.
Further, all models were checked for model convergence and autocorrelation and no
problems were detected.
The second model included level of democracy as the country-level predictor. In
this particular set of cases, the states were relatively similar on democracy scores.
The range varied from a low of “6” to a high of “8.” Interestingly, Guatemala’s
democracy score was “8”, indicating a high level of democracy, while the electoral
monitoring variable indicated significant problems with the state’s electoral process.
Moreover, the lowest democracy score in the sample was “6” in the state of Ecuador,
which had an election certified to be free of problems. This shows that the variation
is indeed different between the two country-level predictors and that the democracy
variable is not simply replicating the country-level variation present in the electoral
monitoring variable.
The final model includes economic performance as the country-level predictor.
Economic performance is measured by the pre- to post-electoral change in GDP per
capita, adjusted for purchasing power parity. In this case, there is significant variation
between countries. The country with the lowest growth, Colombia, experienced a 6.6
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percent decline in this economic measure from the pre- to post-electoral period. By
contrast, Paraguay experienced the highest growth with 31 percent increase in the
measure from pre- to post-electoral periods. Again, the variation on this second-level
predictor is not replicating the variation of the other measures.
The posterior distributions for each of the models is presented graphically in Fig-
ures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6. The strongest country-level effect is the electoral monitoring
variable. In the cases where the electoral monitoring were present and endorsed the
electoral process, the mean of the individual-level intercept increased from 0 to ap-
proximately 1.8, on average. Approximately 85 percent of the posterior distribution
is greater than zero. The other two country-level predictors, democracy and eco-
nomic performance, exhibited a weakly negative effect and no effect, respectively.
For democracy the mean effect was -0.43 and for economic performance, the mean
effect on the individual level intercept was effectively 0. Thus, there is tentative
evidence that when electoral monitors endorse the national electoral process, indi-
viduals are more likely to answer as being more satisfied with democracy than the
pre-electoral period country mean.
68
Figure 3.5: Posterior Distribution: Monitored Election
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Figure 3.6: Posterior Distribution: Level of Democracy
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Figure 3.7: Posterior Distribution: Economic Performance
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As previously mentioned, the predictive models were specified using three training
data subsets of approximately 620 observations each. However, their analytic value
extends beyond how well the particular models fit the data used to specify them. The
data remaining after sampling for training sets was then used to test the predictive
accuracy of each model. A prediction for each observation was calculated and those
values of µi less than or equal to 0 were predicted to be a “0” on the response variable,
indicating that the specific individual did not answer as being satisfied with democ-
racy above the previous period country mean. Those values of µi greater than 0 were
predicted to be a “1” on the response variable, indicating that the specific individual
was more satisfied with democracy than the mean response from the previous period.
Out of the four models, the model with the highest predictive accuracy was the
model that included electoral monitoring as a country-level predictor. Out of 1,533
cases, the model with electoral monitoring as a country-level predictor correctly pre-
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dicted 1,138 cases and the cross-validated prediction rate was approximately 74 per-
cent (See Table 3.2). Model 2 included the state’s level of democracy as the country-
level predictor and was the least accurate predictive model in the group, though this
may be related to measurement of “democracy” as a latent concept. The model cor-
rectly predicted 800 out of 1,533 cases, for an accuracy rate of just over 52 percent.
The largest marginal (i.e. predicting a 1 for every observation) performed equally well.
The final model, which included economic performance as a country-level predictor
correctly predicted 991 out of 1,533 cases, or approximately 64 percent. Moreover,
a model with no country-level predictor performed almost identically, which is ex-
pected given that economic performance was found to have no appreciable effect.
In short, knowing that an election was monitored and that the electoral monitoring
organization certified the election improves the predictive accuracy of a model by
approximately 10 percent.
Table 3.2: Out-of-Sample Predictive Accuracy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Elec. Mon. Democracy Econ. Perf.
Correct 1,138 800 991
Incorrect 395 733 542
Predictive Accuracy 74.2% 52.1% 64.6%
Discussion and Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper has shown a tentative evidence for an em-
pirical relationship between international election monitoring and changes in individ-
ual levels of satisfaction with democracy in six Latin American democracies. Each
of these states held executive elections that were monitored by an international or
non-governmental organization and five of the six experienced increased levels of sat-
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isfaction with democracy. The single state in the sample that did not experience an
increase in levels of confidence is the same state that held an “ambiguous” election,
according to international election monitoring reports. Thus, while tentative, the
evidence presented here suggests several avenues for future research into the conse-
quences of international institutions on individual political attitudes and behaviors.
In addition to the substantive findings, this paper has shown the advantages
Bayesian modeling strategies can yield for comparative political research. Bayesian
modeling has several advantages including its flexibility when faced with missing data,
its easily interpretable results, and its ability to model complex relationships that are
not always tractable within a frequentist framework. I have used several Bayesian
implementations of familiar models including the standard t-test and the hierarchical
logit, and shown tentative evidence of a relationship between electoral monitoring
and micro-level mechanisms of political activation.
While the evidence presented here is only a first look, it does provide a theoret-
ical lens through which international institutions can meaningfully impinge on the
motivations for individual political action. Most obviously, international institutions
constrain and reshape the incentives and opportunities in a given political system for
not only individuals, but also political officials and other actors in the system that
must abide by the rules. The way in which international election monitoring does this
is by raising the costs of attempting electoral manipulation and fraud; when the costs
for cheating are high, politicians seeking support must rely on more traditional means
of currying voters’ favor. In this way, individuals may benefit from the invitation of
an electoral monitor because politicians will seek to win votes by adopting popular
policies that will help get him elected.
Beyond the rationalist effects of international institutions, there are more subtle
but still important ideational effects of these institutions. As Kittilson and Schwindt-
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Bayer (2010) point out, institutions can convey to citizens messages of inclusion or
exclusion from the political process and the most important ideals of a democratic
system. In the case of electoral monitoring, both effects are likely at work. When
states invite an electoral monitor to observe their national electoral process, it signals
to citizens that the government is promoting a free and fair electoral process and that
the role of popular preferences are vital to democratic governance. For these reasons,
when an electoral monitor observes and certifies the election, individuals may be
more confident in the results and more willing to tolerate an electoral loss and wait
for the next opportunity for electoral success rather than resorting to measures that
destabilize democratic governance.
The findings of this research are important because research on the relationship
between political institutions and individual political attitudes and behaviors has to
this point been narrowly focused on domestic institutions. In many ways, interna-
tional and domestic institutions are similar — both constrain the realm of permissible
political action; both reshape the incentives and opportunities in a political system.
However, they are also different in several important respects. While domestic insti-
tutions are considered long-lasting and slow to change, international institutions are
often temporary and short-lived but still consequential for society. By considering
these sorts of questions, this research contributes to our understanding of how and
why individuals engage with and participate in their political systems, how transi-
tioning democracies can stabilize and consolidate, and how international institutions
can be effectively used in domestic governance.
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Chapter 4
INTERNATIONAL LENDING IN A CROSS-NATIONAL CONTEXT
International organizations are important venues for governance in the interna-
tional system. They primarily function to facilitate interstate action to solve col-
lective problems, serve as forums for dispute resolution, and develop international
standards for governance (Abbott and Snidal, 1998). In addition to these functions,
international organizations are frequently relied upon to provide governing assistance
to states where domestic governing capacity is weak (Burnell, 2000). The guiding
question in this project is, given their ubiquity in domestic political contexts, how
do international organizations and the forms of governing assistance they provide to
states affect the prospects for democracy and democratic consolidation, particularly
by affecting the attitudes and behaviors of individual citizens?
The theoretical foundations detailed in Chapter 2 were previously applied to cases
of international election monitoring to show ways that international organizations
can positively influence democratic consolidation. However, there are cases in which
international organziations can undermine democratic stability and consolidation,
which is the focus here. This chapter applies the theory to cases of international
lending, another form of governing assistance that has become increasingly common
in recent decades. To this point, scholarly attention has investigated the macro-level
effects of international lending programs on states and societies, but has devoted far
less attention to the ways in which these programs may impact individuals. Using
what is known about the relationship between domestic institutions and individual
political attitudes and behaviors as a conceptual guide, this chapter contends that
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international institutions, and particularly those associated with governing assistance
from international organizations, can significantly affect individuals in similar ways.
When governing assistance from international organizations is deployed in states,
institutions concomitant to the assistance become temporary institutional features in
the domestic political system. In this way, governing assistance can reshape the insti-
tutional contexts that govern how individuals can interact with their political systems.
For example, one of the most notable features of IMF lending programs is “condi-
tionality,” or officially, structuring a loan agreement such that “[loan] disbursements
[are] made in installments that are linked to demonstrable policy actions,” (IMF,
2013b). In this way, conditionality is an institutional feature temporarily present in
the domestic political system of the borrower state. As Anderson (2007, 592) notes,
“[institutional] contexts are critical for understanding the decisions people make be-
cause they affect different people differently, and people’s decisions, in turn, shape
the nature, shape, and stability of these contexts.” Thus, investigating the ways in
which IMF programs alter the institutional contexts within states will inform how
we understand the attitudes, behaviors, and decisions of individuals within political
systems affected by these programs. More generally, understanding the patterns of
interaction between IMF programs and domestic institutional contexts provides a
better understanding of how lending programs work in practice and the reasons why
they sometimes fail to produce stable and prosperous outcomes.
This chapter focuses on confidence in democratic institutions as dependent vari-
ables because of the role of confidence in sustaining and reinforcing democratic gover-
nance (Dahl, 1997; Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005a; Putnam et al., 1994).
As noted by Newton (2001, 5) “...confidence in institutions is about something deeper
and more fundamental than trust in politicians or in particular governments,” and
serves as a proxy for satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the existing political system
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and its outputs. However, the reference to “democratic institutions,” does not mean
to imply that these institutions are only present or relevant in democratic societies,
but only that these institutions are integral to successful democratic governance.
Applying the theory from chapter 2, this chapter argues that IMF lending pro-
grams exert both direct and indirect effects on individual attitudes toward democratic
institutions. Directly, there is a procedural effect where IMF programs affect the in-
clusion and contestability of the political process (Dahl, 1973). Conditionality alters
the domestic institutional context by affecting the mechanisms of accountability that
citizens typically use to hold leaders accountable. By creating a system where elected
officials become accountable to the IMF in order to continue to receive loan dis-
bursements, the role of citizens is marginalized in the political process, resulting in
individual perceptions of political inefficacy. Citizens, even if they are still included
in the political process, have fewer opportunities to effectively contest the conduct
of government, and therefore may perceive political leaders and the political process
differently.
IMF programs may also yield indirect effects on levels of confidence in democracy
that are mediated by political outcomes. By altering the institutional context in a
state, IMF programs can change the rational incentives for participation in political
activities. As a result, the political outcomes generated by the system may be different
than those generated by the system before the IMF lending program was in place.
Moreover, because conditionality provides convenient cover for officials to implement
unpopular policies (Vreeland, 1999), political outcomes may be strongly opposed by
the general public, yet still implemented. In this way, IMF lending creates conditions
where the popular preferences of citizens may not be reflected in the conduct of
government, violating a primary characteristic of democratic governance (Dahl, 1973).
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The theoretical application leads to several empirical expectations that are testes
in the empirical portion of this chapter. Primarily, I expect that individuals in states
with high levels of dependence on IMF lending should express lower levels of confi-
dence in democratic institutions. Additionally, it is anticipated that the marginaliza-
tion of democratic institutions in a state should be most noticed by the most politically
engaged citizens in society and as a result, the erosion of confidence in democratic
institutions should be sensitive to an individual’s level of educational attainment (as
a proxy for political engagement). 1 Particularly in underdeveloped and relatively
young democracies, as many borrower states are, negative changes in orientations
toward democratic institutions at a minimum threaten the prospects for democratic
consolidation and at the extreme, have the potential to make a state vulnerable to
severe political instability.
The empirical investigation uses data from the 2005 wave of the World Values
Survey to test the hypotheses. Using hierarchical modeling (Bryk and Raudenbush,
1992; Steenbergen and Jones, 2002; Gelman and Hill, 2007) with approximately 1000
respondents in each of 33 democracies, I examine the effect IMF borrowing on trust
in democratic institutions. The results show that individual levels of confidence in
democratic institutions are significantly and inversely related to a state’s overall de-
pendence on IMF lending. Additionally, the results show that the most politically
engaged citizens experience this effect most strongly. This tentative evidence supports
the idea that IMF emergency lending programs may negatively affect individual demo-
cratic attitudes which has significant implications for the ability of a state to foster
1There is no measure of political engagement on the World Values Survey. I argue that education
is an appropriate proxy, because as Hillygus (2005, 25) notes, “Empirical political behavior research
has consistently observed a robust and positive relationship between education and political en-
gagement...” Participation is one important element of political engagement that also has empirical
support for being positively related to educational attainment (Mayer, 2011).
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conditions amenable to the sustenance and consolidation of democratic governance
in times of economic crisis.
IMF Lending and Confidence in Democratic Institutions
To this point, scholarly interest in IMF programs has predominantly focused on
two broad theoretical questions: First, what are the economic and political effects of
IMF programs in states? And second, under what domestic conditions will states will
turn to the IMF for loans? The first theoretical question is the focus here, though
the perspective is novel in that I focus on the effects for individuals in states.
On the first theoretical question posed above, one of the primary relationships of
interest has been the degree to which participation in IMF lending programs helps
or hinders a state’s economic development (Khan, 1990; Conway, 1994; Bird, 1996;
Fischer, 1997; Vreeland, 2003; Dreher, 2006). Though the evidence in somewhat
mixed, a common finding from these studies is that IMF programs hinder economic
growth in the states that undertake them. As Dreher (2005, 21) showed, the longer
an IMF program is in effect, the more severe the consequences for negative economic
growth.
Other scholars have looked at different types of economic and political effects.
Garuda (2000) investigates the effects of IMF lending programs on the economic
conditions of citizens. The study finds that in countries with poor economic con-
ditions, IMF lending significantly exacerbates income inequality by redistributing
income away from the lowest income quintile in the state. A study conducted by
Barro and Lee (2005) looks at a number of effects and concludes that in addition to
reducing economic growth, IMF lending negatively effects levels of democracy and
the rule of law. Studies that engage the first theoretical question noted above start
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with IMF participation as given and investigate the consequences of the programs for
economic and political outcomes in a state.
Despite this narrow focus on the relationship between IMF lending and the macro-
level economic and political effects, there are theoretical reasons to expect that IMF
lending manipulates micro-level processes as well, though these relationships have
been underexplored. For many years, the standard narrative regarding conditionality
in IMF lending programs was that conditions were “imposed” on borrower states
(Stiglitz, 2002, cf.). Contributions from the literature engaging the second theoretical
question posed above have challenged this assumption by suggesting, for example,
that conditionality may not be imposed, but rather may be sought out by elected
leaders in a state to serve as a convenient political cover for enacting certain unpopular
policy reforms that otherwise may not be possible.
Furthermore, the relationship between IMF lending and the income distribution
in states indicates that IMF lending may change the personal economic situation of
individuals living in the states where programs are undertaken. Because IMF lending
arrangements come with structural adjustment conditions that mandate changes to
state spending, these conditions can affect wages, pensions, and the social welfare
system leading to changes in personal economic situations for the individuals that
depend on these programs for their livelihoods.
In general terms, then, IMF programs alter the domestic institutional context
that individuals use to express and articulate their political preferences. The impor-
tant implication is that IMF loans affect individuals more directly than has presently
been studied, and in so doing IMF programs may plausibly affect attitudes and be-
haviors at the micro-behavioral level. This is the primary theoretical question under
investigation here, with particular attention to the ways that IMF lending affects
attitudes toward democratic institutions. This question is important because pop-
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ular confidence in democratic institutions is a prerequisite to the development and
consolidation of democratic governance (Dalton, 1994). Without confidence in the
institutional arrangements associated with democratic governance, the system cannot
effectively survive.
In more specific terms, what are the theoretical linkages that connect IMF lend-
ing programs and individual attitudes toward democracy? Three possible mechanisms
identified in chapter 2 apply here: first, there is a direct procedural mechanism, where
IMF lending programs can affect the inclusiveness and contestability of the political
process; second, there is a direct symbolic mechanism, where undertaking an IMF pro-
gram sends signals to citizens about the values of society, triggering emotive responses
that can alter patterns of political involvement; third, there is an indirect effect of
IMF lending mediated through political outcomes which can affect the outputs that
governments produce and citizens receive.
IMF Lending and Domestic Political Processes
The primary direct effect between IMF lending and individual political attitudes is
what is referred to as the procedural effect, which is the effect that emanates from
altering the process individuals use to make political decisions. As previous research
has shown, when individuals perceive a process as fair, they are more likely to be
satisfied with its outcome, even when that outcome is not the one they preferred
(Anderson, 1998; Feld and Kirchga¨ssner, 2001). For this reason, changes to the po-
litical process that lead citizens to view it as more or less biased should theoretically
influence their level of satisfaction with the outcomes the political system generates.
In order to assess how IMF lending alters the political process, I focus on two
theoretical dimensions of democracy originally articulated by Dahl (1973): the inclu-
siveness of the political process, or who is involved in political decision-making; and
the contestability of the political process, or the opportunities available to individuals
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to contest the conduct of government. It is by restricting both inclusion and contesta-
bility that IMF lending programs negatively affect attitudes toward democracy.
The inclusiveness of a political system refers to the proportion of the population
able to effectively participate in political decision-making (Dahl, 1973). However, the
question addressed here is not about political participation; so how does participation
relate to confidence in democratic institutions? Political participation serves an im-
portant function in any democracy because it gives individuals a say in the conduct
of government and because it serves an educative function that helps to make citizens
aware of how political decisions are made (Bowler and Donovan, 2002). Citizens that
participate in political activity are not only more aware of their role in the political
system, but are also more likely to perceive government responsiveness to their de-
mands (ibid). The primary implication of this finding is that participation in political
activity has the potential to meaningfully affect political attitudes.
How do lending programs affect inclusion and contestability in borrower states?
Consider the “ideal” of democracy, where governments are accountable to citizens.
This relationship implies a connection between citizens’ political preferences and those
policies actually adopted for the state. If this is not the case, citizens have the ability
to punish their representatives by voting them out of office (Przeworski et al., 1999).
This creates a strong incentive for politicians to be responsive to political demands,
because his electoral prospects hinge on satisfaction with overall performance. Indeed,
evidence indicates that there may be a tendency for politicians to make concerted
efforts to elicit and consolidate political support just before an election (Kriner and
Reeves, 2012; Smith, 1996).
However, in states where IMF programs are present, this relationship is supplanted
by an arrangement where governments become accountable to IMF officials monitor-
ing progress toward the adoption of mandated structural adjustments. Kapur and
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Naim (2005, 98) describe this problem by writing “among the most troubling issues
raised by international financial crises is the degree to which elected governments
must answer to external actors rather than domestic constituents.” With this tension
between accountability to IMF officials and accountability to constituents, elected of-
ficials face a difficult dilemma; they can ignore the demands of their constituents and
comply with the terms of the loan arrangement, but must stake their electoral chances
on the possibility that the lending program works and the economy improves enough
that voters retain them despite having been unresponsive to citizens’ demands.
The alternative course of action is to ignore the terms of the lending arrangement,
thereby cutting off emergency loan funding to the state. If this course is taken, citi-
zens’ demands may not be met either, because economies dependent on IMF lending
are in a precarious position to begin with and rely on IMF loans as a last resort.
Without the funds from the IMF, state leaders would be forced to make drastic cuts
in spending in order to remain solvent and still solvency may still be impossible.
Thus, the second alternative presents a much riskier proposition for policymakers:
reject IMF structural adjustments, cease IMF loan funding, and quite possibly ex-
acerbate economic adversity in the state. From this perspective, then, it becomes
rational for state officials to heed the demands of the IMF rather than their own con-
stituents because it is the only alternative with the possibility of a favorable outcome
(in which case, the IMF lending program works as designed, the economy is relieved
of the stresses that plague it, and voters’ confidence in government officials and insti-
tutions is restored). In the meantime, however, the power voters typically hold over
government officials is usurped by the authority of the IMF. Thus, by temporarily
eliminating this connection between citizens and their elected leaders, IMF lending
programs limit one of the primary channels through which citizens could contest the
conduct of government.
82
Consider the example of present-day Greece. The agreement between Greece and
the IMF and European Union (co-lenders), valued somewhere around 240 billion
euros, required a substantial reduction in the national minimum wage, broadening
the tax base in the country, and deep cuts in domestic spending in order to continue
to receive loan disbursements. However, these policies were widely unpopular and
have spurred labor strikes (or near-strikes) and large protests against the measures.
More dramatically, in the most recent Greek election in May 2012, the two major
parties constituting the governing coalition responsible for implementing these reforms
were strongly rejected and as many as seven minor parties won seats in parliament.
Because no governing coalition could be formed between the newly elected parties,
the parliament was dissolved and new legislative elections were held in June. The
June legislative elections yielded a plurality for the New Democracy party, one of the
coalition partners responsible for the implementation of the IMF program, and New
Democracy leaders invited all parties to participate in a coalition that would respect
the terms of the lending agreement already in place.
In this case, the citizens of Greece strongly rejected the parties responsible for
emergency lending programs, in no small part because of the unpopular policies at-
tached to the program. However, the second legislative election kept the major party
in power which formed the governing coalition with the presumption that the terms
of the lending agreement would be upheld. Thus, even with the ostensible ability to
punish leaders by voting them out of office, citizen’s electoral choices were, in prac-
tice, limited and changed very little about the political reality in the state. Further,
it is startling that despite such widespread and virulent opposition to the terms of the
agreement, the major political parties remained accountable to the IMF-EU officials
and not to their own constituencies and were able to impose policies detested by the
public.
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Individual experiences with these imposed institutional arrangements and the pol-
icy changes they catalyze will impact the formation of individual political attitudes
toward the state, its institutions, and the system of government by which the rules
are made (Lipsky, 1980; Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Welzel and Inglehart, 2007). In
cases where individual experiences are largely negative resulting from, for example,
economic insecurity or political inefficacy, citizens are more apt to lose confidence in
the institutional arrangement from which the negative experiences emanate (Lipset,
1959; Sales, 1972; Inglehart, 2000). In this way, one’s experience with the state bu-
reaucracy has a direct bearing on that individual’s confidence and approval of that
bureaucratic arrangement. According to the theory proposed in Chapter 2, in cases
where IMF programs are present, policymakers are less responsive and less account-
able to citizens, translating into negative experiences and a loss of public confidence.
More specifically, I expect to observe a loss of confidence in parliament because pol-
icy outcomes are poor and a loss of confidence in political parties because they are
unresponsive to popular political preferences.
Importantly, the relationship between institutional context and political prefer-
ences is not unidirectional, but rather reciprocal (Anderson, 2007, 590). Institutions
have a direct bearing on the types of experiences individuals have, individual expe-
riences orient political attitudes toward systems of government, and mass political
attitudes determine which institutional contexts may survive. For the purposes of
this argument, this means that sustained and repeated negative democratic experi-
ences not only affect the levels of confidence in these specific institutions, but also
the democratic system of government more generally.
There is a second direct effect, which is referred to as the symbolic effect. Kittilson
and Schwindt-Bayer (2010, 2012) show that institutions send signals to individuals
about the values of society, and in so doing, can trigger emotive responses that affect
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their attitudes and behaviors in their political systems. In cases where these symbolic
messages are positive and inclusive (such as adopting gender quotas, or monitoring
democratic elections) individuals may feel that the state values their participation in
the democratic process, and as a result, may be more likely to participate and more
confident in the outputs of the system. Conversely, when the symbolic messages are
exclusionary, the opposite effects may manifest. In the case of international lending,
I argue that it sends messages to citizens that in times of economic insecurity, their
participation in the political process is not valued, and their demands are unimpor-
tant. As a result, it is expected that individuals will express lower levels of confidence
in democratic institutions.
More specifically, the suppression of democratic institutions conveys ideational
messages that undermine individual perceptions of democratic inclusiveness and po-
litical efficacy. The more often these institutions become unresponsive, the more
powerful the effect on citizen’s levels of confidence should be, because institutional
unresponsiveness reinforces the idea that in times of adversity the democratic process
becomes defunct rather than determining the path to recovery. I theoretically expect
that IMF programs lead to a loss of public confidence in the government more gener-
ally, then, because citizens feel excluded when democratic institutions are suppressed
in the state and that this effect becomes stronger the longer the state is involved with
IMF lending arrangements.
It should be noted that the symbolic effect is considerably more challenging to iso-
late empirically. In fact, there is no good way to distinguish between the procedural
and symbolic effects in the empirical analyses. The theory is only trying to specify the
possible mechanisms that may be linking governing assistance to individual-level atti-
tudes and behaviors, and the symbolic mechanism is one possibility. Future research
will be required to separate these effects empirically.
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In addition to the direct effects, there is an indirect effect linking IMF lending
programs to changes in individual political attitudes that is mediated by political
outcomes. In other words, changes to the inclusiveness and contestability of a political
system not only affect how political decisions are made, but also the outcomes of the
decisions themselves. For example, in the case of Greece, if the political process had
not been altered to include IMF officials to hold elected leaders accountable, many of
the policies that have subsequently been enacted may not have passed muster without
this alternate accountability mechanism in place. This analysis is agnostic about the
issue of whether political leaders sometimes enter into IMF agreements for political
cover to enact unpopular reforms. In either case, however, such an argument assumes
the kinds of linkages proposed here between individuals and international institutions,
and thus support the theoretical expectations proposed above.
Analyses to answer the proposed questions requires must be careful, because states
that require assistance from the IMF typically have severe economic troubles and only
request IMF lending when access to private credit markets is restricted. Observation-
ally, this means that levels of confidence in democratic institutions will be negatively
impacted before the program is implemented, because the effectiveness of government
is related to the public’s approval of the system (Easton, 1965; Anderson and Singer,
2008). Requiring an emergency loan from an international organization unequivo-
cally conveys that the government has been ineffective at least in its management of
the economy. For this reason, individual levels of confidence in democratic institu-
tions should deteriorate. But this effect is independent of the IMF program, not a
result of it, so it is necessary to distinguish between the two effects when investigat-
ing the relationship between IMF programs and levels of confidence in democratic
institutions. This project is concerned with the effects of IMF programs and their
associated institutional impositions and attempts to empirically isolate this outcome.
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Isolating these effects is difficult, however, because they result from phenomena
that are difficult to precisely observe. When IMF programs are implemented, changes
in the institutional context within the state are common; however, it is difficult to
precisely measure how accountable an elected official is or how much influence indi-
viduals have on the policymaking process in the state. Thus, a method to distinguish
institutional effects of the type proposed above from other effects linked to IMF pro-
grams, such as economic ones, is needed. Institutional effects, particularly the ones
described in the proposed theory, largely deal with individuals’ abilities to meaning-
fully participate in politics. As such, I expect that the changes will primarily affect
the most politically engaged in society. In other words, I use an interaction to isolate
the institutional effects by hypothesizing that those individuals most attuned to the
political process will be most affected by the changes resulting from the imposition
of IMF programs.
The effectiveness of an interaction with political engagement may seem only a
marginally effective solution to the problem of separating the economic effects from
the institutional ones of interest. However, previous research provides some back-
ground as to why this type of identification strategy may be appropriate in this
particular case. In cases of financial crises, particularly in developing democracies,
leaders are vulnerable and thus seek to keep their selectorates satisfied in order to
maintain power (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2011). In cases of shrinking resource
pools, this can be a difficult task. Thus, one characteristic shared in many financial
crises in developing democracies is that marginalized groups suffer most in economic
terms when state funds become restricted. Funds for welfare programs, food assis-
tance, and other types of government assistance to poor and vulnerable groups is often
cut in favor of providing goods and services to those with the will and ability to keep
leaders in power. If this is the case, then the economic effect should yield an empirical
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effect directly inverse to the institutional effects. That is, the least politically engaged
should be most negatively affected in an economic sense, because their services are
the first to be cut by governments in budget-slashing efforts. It may still be true that
the levels of confidence of the politically engaged will be negatively affected by the
simple act of their government seeking an emergency loan; but by the same token,
these cases of emergency funding are rarely as widely publicized as Greece’s case, and
rarely as urgent. Thus, while recognizing it as an imperfect solution to isolating the
effects of interest to this project, this strategy should at least help to minimize any
spuriousness in the models.
Based on the theoretical framework presented above, the following hypotheses will
serve as the basis of the empirical portion of the paper:
H1 Individuals’ levels of confidence in democratic institutions will be negatively
related to a state’s total dependence on IMF lending arrangements. In states
where there has been no or little dependence on IMF lending, individuals will
exhibit higher levels of confidence in democratic institutions than individuals
in states habitually dependent on IMF lending, all else equal.
H2 This effect will be sensitive to an individual’s level of educational attainment,
because the most educated and politically engaged citizens will experience the
effects of political inefficacy and exclusion most strongly.
Data, Measurement, and Multilevel Modeling
Multilevel modeling can be thought of as a regression that includes a variable
representing group membership (Gelman and Hill, 2007, 251). The advantage of this
model over a model without multiple levels is that it corrects the problems of esti-
mating variance between similar groups. The model could be alternatively estimated
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by either completely pooling the data (ignoring the group membership altogether)
or not pooling the data at all and estimating a different model for each group (in
this case, for each country in the sample). However, in the former case, variation
is completely ignored and in the latter, variation is overstated (Gelman and Hill,
2007, 253). This is because in the first case, group membership characteristics that
might affect whether individual i in country j does or does not trust a democratic
institution are not considered (for example, the overall level of democracy within a
country that varies by country). With no pooling, it is impossible to state a gener-
alizable relationship between variables of interest, as each case is context dependent.
Additionally, in cases where each group is estimated individually and there is a small
sample within a single group, the variation between that group and others may be
overstated because of the low level of confidence in an estimate based on few data
points. Therefore, the multilevel model corrects these problems by partially pooling
data and modeling two distinct levels of predictors: in this case, both individual- and
country-level characteristics with theoretical links to individual trust in democratic
institutions are included in the modeling process.
This analysis uses data from the latest wave of the World Values Survey (WVS
2005), the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank to test the hypotheses
from the theoretical portion of the paper. For the operationalization of the dependent
variables, I use a series of questions from the World Values Survey asking about re-
spondents’ level of confidence in three democratic institutions of interest: government,
political parties, and parliament.
I focus on these specific institutions because each is important is evaluating pop-
ular support for democratic governance and because there are theoretical expecta-
tions that IMF programs will affect levels of popular confidence in these institutions
specifically. Measuring individual levels of confidence in government provides an ap-
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proximation of ones’ feelings of inclusion in and satisfaction with the political system
(Robinson et al., 1999). Thus, this dependent variable is related to the unresponsive-
ness of democratic institutions and the concomitant exclusion individuals perceive.
As discussed above, it is expected that the more dependent a state is on IMF lending,
the lower individual levels of confidence in government will be.
Additionally, measuring confidence in political parties and parliament captures
the effects emanating from the alternate accountability that exists with IMF arrange-
ments as well as the dissatisfaction resulting from inefficacy in altering the course of
public policy. Levels of confidence in political parties and parliament signify a pos-
itive or negative response to the performance and policy outputs of political parties
and parliament (Catterberg and Moreno, 2006). If political parties are responsive
to citizens’ demands and parliamentary outputs are commensurate with the popu-
lar will, levels of confidence in these institutions should be high, and vice versa. If
an IMF program creates a problem of external accountability, levels of confidence in
these institutions should be lower in democracies highly dependent on IMF programs
than those not.
The cases in the dataset were selected based on scores on the Polity IV index at
the time of the survey. All counties included in the 2005 wave of the WVS that scored
“6” or higher on Polity IV were included. “6” was used as the cutoff because this is
the benchmark for being considered a democracy (Marshall and Jaggers, 2010). As
a result, only states classified as democracies are included in the study. However,
the age of a democracy could have an effect on levels of confidence as well, because
recently transitioned democracies can experience a “honeymoon” period where pop-
ular expectations about the new system of government are high (Bernhard et al.,
2003). Additionally, as noted by Gerring et al. (2012) the developmental benefits of
democracy are longer-term and new states may have yet to consolidate these bene-
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fits. For these reasons, each model controls for the age of the democracy, measured
in the number of continuous years (descending from the year 2005) that each state
has scored “6” or higher on the Polity IV scale.
The independent variable of interest measures a state’s total dependence on IMF
lending. The measure starts from March 1986, which was when concessional financing
to low-income countries transitioned to being provided by the Structural Adjustment
Facility (SAF). 2 This is the beginning of the dataset because structural adjustments
became much more common features of lending programs starting around this time
(Stone, 2011, 76). Each state was coded as a percentage representing the number
of months since March 1986 or date of membership 3 that the state had an active
IMF lending program, with the exclusion of Flexible Credit Lines, 4 (See Figure 4.1).
While alternative measures might include the size of loan packages, this measure is less
appropriate in this case because no matter the aggregate value of a lending program,
similar types of structural adjustments and monitoring mechanisms are used. The
effect of interest here how international lending programs and their institutional
attachments alter the institutional context within states should not be significantly
vary by the size of programs.
2The Structural Adjustment Facility has since been renamed and altered as part of reforms to
lending instruments. However, the reforms were centered on issues unrelated to the issues of interest
in this paper and make no discernible difference to the present argument. The reformed lending
instruments still contain structural adjustments and monitoring, which is the foundation of this
argument.
3The following list contains the states included in the dataset that were not members of the IMF
in March 1986, as well as the date the state became an independent member: Republic of Poland,
June 1986; Bulgaria, September 1990; Ukraine, September 1992; Republic of Moldova, August 1992;
Georgia, May 1992; Republic of Serbia, December 1992.
4Although the start of the Structural Adjustment Facility is the beginning of the dataset, not all
lending programs included in the dataset are through this instrument. All IMF lending arrangements
except for the Flexible Credit Line (FCL) programs are included. FCL programs are excluded
because typically they have no structural adjustments attached.
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Figure 4.1: Dependence on IMF Lending, 1986-2010
Understandably, there are many other variables that affect levels of confidence
in democratic institutions. Following the literature on the subject, the analysis in-
cludes a number of alternative explanatory variables commonly linked with individual
attitudes toward democracy and trust in democratic institutions. Among the most
important are individual-level characteristics including age, gender, ideology, religion,
income, and education. The theoretical connections between these and attitudes to-
ward democracy have been covered elsewhere and I refer the reader to that work for
the discussion (Anderson and Singer, 2008).
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At the country level, I include alternative explanatory variables including Polity
IV score, the rate of literacy among adults ages 15 and over, and the linear log of
the population. Further, each model includes variables indicating proportional repre-
sentation or mixed electoral systems because of the potential effect of consociational
arrangements on political incorporation and the resulting effect for levels of confidence
in the system (Beck et al., 2001).
Also at the country-level, I include variables measuring economic conditions within
the state to empirically separate the effects of IMF lending arrangements from the
effects of poor economic performance. As a proxy for social spending, I use a measure
of a state’s spending on public healthcare as a percentage of GDP. This measure is
appropriate both because it incorporates states that do not spend significantly on
other forms of social welfare programs (social security or unemployment, for example)
and because of the lack of consistent cross-national data on other social spending
programs. Also included is the linear log of GDP per capita as a measure of economic
development, the 2005 rates of GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment, and the
level of debt to the IMF as a ratio of Special Drawing Rights to the state’s GDP
measured in millions of USD.
Finally, in order to ensure that the results are not only measuring government
ineffectiveness, two final country-level variables are included. I rely on the World
Bank index of government effectiveness, a measure that uses individual-level survey
data and expert opinion to assess the perceived effectiveness of government in a given
state 5 , and Transparency International’s measure of government corruption. 6 By
5The World Bank description of the variable writes, “Government Effectiveness captures percep-
tions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility
of the government’s commitment to such policies.”
6In other specifications of the model (results not presented) the models controlled for GINI, as
this has been found to be important in past work (Anderson and Singer, 2008, cf.). However, there
were no consistent measures available for 2005 for the universe of cases included here. When using
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including these variables, the explanatory power of IMF dependence is independent of
either condition, in case confidence in democratic institutions is driven predominantly
by either.
As one further test of the proposed theory, I include an interaction between IMF
dependence 7 and education, a variable that is positively and robustly related to po-
litical engagement (Hillygus, 2005). If the effect is the result of institutional changes
that impact an individual’s political efficacy and inclusion, the most politically en-
gaged should be the individuals who are most negatively affected by the changes.
Thus, I expect that when the interaction is included, the effects of IMF dependence
will be most significant for educated individuals, all else equal.
Due to the ordinal-level nature of the dependent variables, I follow the advice
of Gelman and Hill (2007, 123) and model a series of logistic regressions for each
outcome against the remaining higher levels (1 against 2, 3, and 4; 2 against 3 and
4; 3 against 4). In this way, there is more flexibility in fitting the data to the specific
models but also has the disadvantages of losing some efficiency in the estimates and
yielding coefficients that are more difficult to interpret. Among the models available
to estimate ordinal-outcome multilevel logistic regressions however, this is be the best
alternative. 8
only 2005 GINI data and excluding all other cases, it had no significant effect on the results. I then
tested model fit between the full model without GINI controls and the restricted model with GINI,
and found the full model to be a better fit of the data.
7Because degrees of freedom were limited at the country-level, I collapsed this from a continuous
level variable into a five-level variable: No dependence; 1 - 24 percent dependence; 25 - 49 percent
dependence; 50 - 74 percent dependence; and 75 - 100 percent dependence.
8Other studies have used factor analysis to estimate the relationship between different dependent
variables and then created an index from these estimates as one way to approximate a continuous
dependent variable (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer, 2010; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005b). However,
factor analysis is a linear function with strong assumptions that are rarely satisfied in practice.
This renders its use problematic in creating indices for dependent variables. Primarily (and most
importantly for purposes here) factor analysis assumes that the distance between levels “1” and “2”
in the ordinal measure is the same as the distance between levels “3” and “4”, which is not true.
Thus, the estimates that factor analysis provides and the resulting index face the same problems
one would face when estimating a four-level ordinal measure with OLS regression. For this reason,
I refrain from the use of factor analysis or indexing here.
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For each dependent variable, I present the results of the first model that estimates
the probability of a respondent answering in the lowest category (for the measures
here, “no confidence”) as opposed to any of the other three (“very little confidence”;
“some confidence”; “a lot of confidence”). 9 This is an important difference that
grants significant leverage in explaining individual orientations toward democratic
institutions, particularly in relation to the institutional contexts within states and
the necessary conditions for successful democratic governance. An expression of no
confidence unequivocally conveys immense dissatisfaction with the current system.
Results
For each dependent variable, I estimate two models. The first model estimates
the effect of IMF dependence on confidence in democratic institutions, ignoring any
potential interaction between independent variables. The second model includes an
interaction term to test the hypothesis that the most politically engaged citizens are
most negatively affected by the institutional changes resulting from IMF programs.
The results are mixed, but generally supportive of my hypotheses.
Before discussing the country-level results, it should be noted that the individual
determinants of trust in democratic institutions are significant predictors in the ex-
pected directions. Age, education, gender, and ideology are significant across most
models. 10 It is also important to note the variation between individual- and
country-level coefficients. Due to both the great amount of variation explained by
9I coded the dependent variables so that a negative sign indicates less confidence in democratic
institutions. The interpretation, then, is that individuals are less likely to have answered in any of
the three alternate levels, each indicating some level of confidence in the institution.
10All individual-level variables, which are consistently found to be significant determinants of
support for democracy, are not significant in all models. However, the relationship between these
individual-level variables and confidence in various institutions has not been definitively established
in the literature and therefore I expect that in cases where these variables are insignificant, there are
good theoretical explanations. It is beyond the scope of this paper to undertake such an investigation.
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the individual-level variables and the number of observations of individuals versus
groups, there is much less variation to be explained at the country-level in the model
(Anderson and Singer, 2008). As a result, the substantive effects of country-level
variables are smaller in magnitude.
The proposed theory suggests that changes in the institutional contexts within
states that marginalize democratic institutions result in a loss of individuals’ confi-
dence in these institutions. I tested levels of confidence in three specific democratic
institutions: government, political parties, and parliament. The results are presented
in Table 4.1. Full results for country-level predictors are included in Appendix A. I
present the estimates of the coefficients as well as the standard errors and signifiers
showing statistical significance at the .05 level. Model 1 shows that IMF programs
have the weakest effect on confidence in government generally. The effect does not
reach standard levels of statistical significance, but is in the expected direction. Sim-
ilarly, when the interaction is included, the marginal effect of the interaction term
indicates that more educated individuals are no more negatively affected than less
educated individuals (Brambor et al., 2006). Figure 4.2 presents the marginal effects
for levels of confidence in all three institutions.
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Models 3 and 4 look at confidence in parliament. The results are statistically
significant and in the expected direction. For each 10 percent increase in a state’s
dependence on IMF lending, individuals are between 1.10 and 1.25 times more likely
to answer as having no confidence in parliament. 11 Substantively, considering
that states that borrow from the IMF often do so habitually, this means that the
effects can be very important. Consider Argentina, with over 80 percent dependence:
compared to having no loan programs at all, individuals in Argentina are between
2.05 and 6.29 times more likely to answer as having no confidence in parliament, all
else equal.
When the interaction is included, the marginal effect of the interaction term shows
that more highly educated individuals are significantly more negatively affected than
the less educated and the effect is strongest for the most educated. This result
supports the argument related to institutional changes that affect individuals’ political
efficacy and inclusion. The most politically engaged feel the effect most acutely.
11The models return the logged odds ratio. These ranges are calculated by exponentiating the log
odds coefficient +/- 1.96 times the standard error.
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Figure 4.2: Marginal Effects: Confidence in Democratic Institutions
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The results for confidence in political parties (models 5 and 6) support the stated
hypotheses, as well. For each 10 percent increase in a state’s IMF dependence, individ-
uals are between 1.13 and 1.27 times more likely to answer as having no confidence in
political parties. When the interaction term is included in model 6, the results again
show that highly educated individuals are more negatively affected than others. Thus,
in two of the three primary democratic institutions tested, levels of confidence are
significantly and inversely related to a state’s overall dependence on IMF lending.
Figure 4.3 shows the predicted probabilities of an individual answering as having no
confidence in the three institutions tested, leaving all controls at their means and
modes. It shows that as IMF dependence increases, individuals are significantly more
likely to answer as having no confidence in democratic institutions.
Figure 4.3: Predicted Probabilities: Confidence in Democratic Institutions
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Relatedly, in two of three institutions, the most politically engaged are the most
negatively affected by the changes resulting from IMF lending arrangements. This
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result supports the theory of institutional changes that impact individuals’ percep-
tions of political efficacy and inclusion. If the effects of IMF programs were solely
economic, there would be no theoretical reason to expect that IMF programs should
most strongly affect the politically engaged because as noted by Vreeland (2003),
IMF programs tend to redistribute income upward and the costs of such policies are
concentrated among the least politically organized (Nooruddin and Simmons, 2006).
The implication of these findings is that if the effects of IMF programs were solely
economic, the poor and least politically engaged should be most negatively affected
by them. The findings here, by contrast, show that IMF programs most strongly
erode the confidence of the most politically engaged, suggesting that the effects go
beyond economics and negatively affect citizens in other ways.
Discussion and Conclusion
There is no dearth of scholarly inquiry into the effects of IMF programs on domes-
tic societies. Most of this research has focused on the relationship between lending
programs and domestic economic and political conditions. In this chapter, I applied
the theoretical framework articulated in chapter 2 to explore a related, yet distinct
relationship between IMF programs and individual levels of confidence in democratic
institutions. I theorized that because IMF programs undermine existing democratic
institutions in states that undertake them, levels of confidence in democratic institu-
tions would be negatively impacted, and that the effects would increase in strength
as a state’s dependence on IMF lending increased. I expected these effects to be par-
ticularly strong for the most politically engaged citizens, because they would perceive
political inefficacy and exclusion more acutely than less engaged citizens. These hy-
potheses were tested using multilevel models and data from the World Values Survey.
The major conclusions are:
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1 Individual levels of confidence in democratic institutions are significantly and
inversely related to their states’ dependence on IMF lending. IMF programs
negatively impact individuals’ confidence in democratic institutions by creating
conditions that make it difficult for democratic institutions to operate effec-
tively. Structural adjustments suppress democratic institutions in the state and
exclude citizens from participating in the political system. The significant find-
ings for confidence in parliament and political parties support this conclusion.
I suspect that the non-finding with confidence in government is related to the
ambiguity of that specific question. Individuals might have different concep-
tions of what constitutes “the government” (the present administration, the
constitutional arrangement, the particular type of government, etc.) whereas
the others are more specific and easily definable.
2 The effect was sensitive to levels of formal education. This finding suggests
that the changes resulting from IMF programs affect not only the economies of
states, but also the institutional contexts that structure the opportunities and
incentives for participation in politics. I argued that IMF programs are a specific
type of democratic assistance that leads to institutional changes that suppress
democratic institutions within the state. The implication is that individuals are
less capable of affecting the course of politics in their state and holding their
elected officials accountable. Including this interaction term in the models and
finding significant results lends support to precisely this type of institutional
effect: the most politically engaged individuals are the most acutely affected
because their perceptions of political efficacy and inclusion most noticeably
deteriorate.
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These conclusions suggest several important implications. First, if the goal of
IMF programs is to provide economic stability for states by promoting effective gov-
ernance, the fact that lending programs are linked with lower levels of confidence in
democratic institutions should serve as an impetus to question the ways in which
lending arrangements are designed. I have discussed several ways in which these
programs are theoretically and logically connected to confidence in democratic in-
stitutions. More specific to the argument here, bringing democratic participation
back in might be one important way that lending instruments could be modified to
enhance, rather than inhibit, effective governance and popular support during times
of crisis borrowing. However, as noted by Borowiak (2007) democratic legitimacy is
only one of many types of legitimacy, so democratization is not the only or perhaps
even the best reform to make international lending more effective.
Second, this chapter contributes to the relatively new but quickly growing lit-
erature investigating the nexus between the institutional context within states and
political behavior. The ways that institutions exert effects upon individuals and their
political choices are an important and understudied phenomenon in comparative po-
litical research. This paper makes a contribution to this literature by showing that
institutional contexts are not merely a product of domestic conditions, but that they
are also strongly shaped by international forces leading to significant effects on the
political attitudes and behaviors of individuals. Election monitoring in the previous
chapter and international lending in the present chapter are only two such interna-
tional forces that may shape the development of a states’ institutional arrangement.
I suspect that there are many more. More research is needed to determine precisely
what types of international forces may have similar effects and how these effects
translate to changes in individual political attitudes and behaviors.
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Finally, this chapter adds to the growing literature within comparative politi-
cal research that utilizes multilevel models to more fully account for country- and
individual-level effects. The models are relatively novel in their use in comparative
political research and are incredibly useful for their ability to disentangle the power
of effects from error and non-stochastic variance. Beyond examining the effects of
institutional variation on individual-level characteristics generally, these models al-
low us to organize individual observations into groups with varying characteristics
that might affect an individual’s propensity to feel positively or negatively toward
democratic governance. Individual- and group-level characteristics can be modeled
to more fully appreciate the contingencies associated with each and their respective
relationships with institutional contexts within states.
This analysis also faces important limitations. Most obviously, the causal mech-
anisms identified in this particular context are difficult to isolate observationally.
Government ineffectiveness and economic adversity undoubtedly have an impact on
individual levels of confidence in institutions. However, I argue that by controlling for
these conditions and still observing significant effects and by adding the additional
check provided by the inclusion of the interaction term, I have provided strong, yet
tentative evidence to support the basic theory.
Second, it should be emphasized that it is not borrowing from an international
organization, as such, that results in lower levels of confidence in democratic insti-
tutions, but only the manner in which the lending arrangements are designed and
implemented in states. In other words, the theory proposed in chapter two gener-
ates empirical expectations based on how the international institutions interact with
existing democratic institutions. In other words, if lending programs could be de-
signed such that they enhanced existing democratic institutions, the theory proposed
here would suggest the opposite empirical effects from the ones expected in this case.
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Moreover, if institutional changes undermined existing democratic institutions in the
absence of an IMF lending arrangement, I would expect similar decreases in individ-
ual levels of confidence in democratic institutions. However, these findings are still
relevant for states undertaking IMF programs, particularly if no meaningful reform
to lending instruments presently utilized by the IMF takes place.
Finally, as Schelling (1978), (cited in (Cederman and Girardin, 2007)) notes, the
task of connecting micro-level mechanisms and macro-level behaviors is an onerous
one. This is also true when connecting macro-level mechanisms to micro-level be-
haviors, as presented here. This study certainly runs the risk, like any such study,
of missing a causal pathway or behavioral link that might affect the results. I be-
lieve that the models are theoretically well-defined, substantively important, and
empirically sound and have accounted for those variables found previously to most
significantly affect individual democratic attitudes.
The scholarship linking cross-national institutional variation with individual po-
litical attitudes is developing rapidly. This research contributes to this literature
by theorizing a way that institutional contexts within states can be affected by in-
ternational influences, thereby impacting individuals. I find this to be an important
contribution, especially as it pertains to the political economy of international organi-
zations and the relationship between international institutions and domestic politics.
The IMF has as a goal the economic and political development of states, but im-
plements programs that deteriorate the population’s capacity to embrace and sustain
democratic governance. For this reason, the lending instruments provided by the IMF
should be interrogated so as to reform those mechanisms that hinder progress in this
regard.
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Chapter 5
MULTILATERALISM AND ATTITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRACY IN GHANA
AND GREECE
While the previous two chapters have worked to establish a statistical relationship
between variables measuring the interventions of interest and changes in individual po-
litical attitudes, no causal relationship should be inferred from those findings. Rather,
the evidence from these chapters should be considered a check to determine whether
investigating cases for evidence of the causal mechanisms hypothesized is necessary.
That is, while the findings to this point provide some support for the plausibility of
the theory articulated in Chapter 2, it does not provide sufficient support for any
of the specific causal pathways that may link governing interventions to individual
political attitudes. Finding evidence for these causal pathways is the goal of this
chapter.
This chapter focuses on two instances of governing interventions as case studies to
explore the micro-level theoretical foundations identified in the hypotheses. Applying
a form of the “diverse cases” methodology proposed by Seawright and Gerring (2008),
I use variation in expected outcomes to identify two cases – electoral monitoring
in Ghana and international lending in Greece – that represent “easy” tests of the
theory, insofar as the case selection strategy specifically identifies cases where the
hypothesized relationships are most likely to become observable. It is important to
note that these case studies are not “theory confirming” in the sense that a more
comprehensive case study might be. Rather, given the wide variation in the types
of cases and the dimensions relevant to individual political involvement, this test
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is meant to be exploratory in order to determine the plausibility of the micro-level
theoretical foundations underlying the hypothesized relationships.
Even with the evidence identified in this chapter, a strictly causal relationship can-
not be inferred, but the combination of sound theory, strong cross-national statistical
evidence, and the quantitative and qualitative evidence supporting the micro-level
foundations identified by the theory provide support that international governing in-
terventions can and do affect individual political attitudes and behaviors. However,
further research will be required to establish how these connections work in particular
cases, and the magnitude of the effects, given certain conditions in the states where
governing interventions are most commonly used.
Case Selection Methodology
A methodologically well-grounded case selection strategy is essential for quality
case study research. The purpose of case study research is to “...[analyze] a single
unit or small number of units (the cases), where the researcher’s goal is to understand
a larger class of similar units (a population of cases),” (Seawright and Gerring, 2008,
296). As such, choosing cases that are most well-suited to understanding features of
a population of cases is essential.
While pragmatic considerations are, of course, an important element of case se-
lection, they cannot be the only consideration in choosing cases. Methodological
justification is essential, which is to say that a good case study design must support
the cases one selects beyond the considerations of practicality (data availability, the
researcher speaks the language, theoretical interest in recent literature, etc.). When
cases are selected according to a particular methodology, the findings from the case
study analysis can be used to make more generalizable inferences about the popula-
tion from which the cases were selected. If case selection is not executed according to
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sound methodological principles, there is a risk that conclusions and generalizations
resulting from the analysis are biased and do not accurately represent the character-
istics of the population from which the cases were drawn.
To select cases for this chapter, I followed the methodological advice offered by
Seawright and Gerring (2008) which identifies and explains several strategies for case
selection and the conditions under which they may be useful. One of the approaches
they identify is the “diverse cases” approach, which is useful here for understanding
the full range of variance along the relevant case dimensions. In this particular case,
there are several causal mechanisms identified by the theory, but one “causal process”
of interest where each of these individual mechanisms works in tandem to affect
outcomes on the dependent variable (at the individual level). For this reason, the
case selection methodology comports with the strategy taken with the quantitative
approach previously, which is to select a “positive” case and “negative” case or a
case where governing interventions support existing democratic institutions and one
where governing interventions suppress them. It is in this sense that the cases are
“diverse” and capture the variance of the population of cases.
In addition to adopting the diverse cases approach to understand the population
of cases to which this theory applies, the cases here also adopt the “structured” and
“focused” approach identified by George and Bennett (2005, 69). The comparison
of cases is structured in that I compare each case against a set of general questions
related to the research objective. In the present case, the research objective is to
determine how institutions associated with governing interventions sanctioned by in-
ternational organizations reinforce or undermine existing democratic institutions in
states. The theory elaborated in Chapter 2 then leads to empirical expectations based
on this assessment. In a case where the institutions associated with a governing inter-
vention reinforce existing democratic institutions in a state, the empirical expectation
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is that individual attitudes toward democracy would improve, because the democratic
process has additional mechanisms to support democratic involvement and keep the
process fair. Conversely, in a case where institutions associated with a governing
intervention undermine existing democratic institutions, the empirical expectation is
that individual attitudes toward democracy would deteriorate, because individuals are
unable to navigate their political system through traditional channels and the system
may be perceived as unresponsive. Thus, cases of international election monitoring
and international lending–and any other governing intervention deployed by interna-
tional organizations in developing democracies–become comparable insofar as each
of these interventions has observable effects in the ways that they affect state-level
democratic institutions, and can be assessed for their relative effect in this regard.
The cases here are focused in that I deal only with certain aspects of each case
study relevant to the research objectives. In other words, there may be attributes of
the cases under investigation that are important, but unrelated to the research goals of
the study, and consequently ignored. In this particular case comparison, for example,
international lending may have some tie to a state’s status as a former colony; this
is important, but not necessarily for the purposes of the research question being
investigated here. The cases here are tentative explorations intended to show that
the statistical findings from previous chapters have sufficient micro-level theoretical
foundations.
At this point, the case selection strategy requires that the selected cases be di-
verse on the set of independent variables 1 and that the cases be analyzed in a
structured and focused manner so as to make the cases comparable on only the rel-
evant dimensions. However, while these two strategies guide the general set of cases
1I refer to “set of independent variables” not in the specific sense, but in the sense of the indepen-
dent variables considered together lead to both positive and negative cases of governing intervention.
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available for selection (one positive and one negative), they do not inform why or
how any particular case should be selected from these larger populations. Thus, I
also adopt a common strategy in case study research by selecting “most-likely” cases
for investigation.
So called “most-likely” cases (or their converse, “least-likely” cases) are cases
“...which are likely to either clearly confirm or irrefutably falsify propositions and
hypotheses,” (Flyvbjerg, 2006). That is, the case selection methodology assumes
that if the theory is (or is not) true in this particular “easy test” case, then the
theory is (or is not) plausible for a wider set of cases from which the most or least
likely case was drawn. It should be emphasized that this case selection strategy
sets a lower analytic bar, insofar as the generalizations that may be applied to the
populations from which these cases are drawn is more limited. However, when theories
have not been tested thoroughly, most-likely designs yield important insights about
the appropriate conditions to bind the theory and establish micro-level foundations
for phenomena occurring at the macro-level (George and Bennett, 2005). Given the
limited analytical goals of the present chapter which are more focused on establishing
the plausibility and existence of the necessary micro-level theoretical foundations than
on a purely “theory testing” analysis, this strategy is appropriate and fruitful.
Most-Likely cases: Electoral Monitoring in Ghana and International Lending in
Greece
Given the methodological principles guiding case selection strategy, the task now
is to evaluate which cases are most likely to exhibit the theorized relationships. The
proposed hypotheses from each of the previous two chapters expect that the size
of the effect on individual political attitudes to be dependent on characteristics of
the governing intervention itself. For example, in the case of international lending,
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the size and particularly the length of time a lending program and its concomitant
provisions are in place, the more acute the effects should be at the individual level. In
the case of international election monitoring, it is also the size, scope, and visibility
of the mission that affects how influential the mission will be in affecting individual
perceptions.
Using these criteria to come to more specific attributes, a “most-likely” case of elec-
toral monitoring is one where the mission was in the country for an extended duration
of time relative to other electoral monitoring missions; where the monitoring mission
had broad coverage over a country, not merely concentrated in population centers
or particular potentially troubled locations; and where the scope of the monitoring
mission included different forms of assistance, but especially physical monitoring of
polling locations on election day. Theoretically, these are the attributes of electoral
monitoring missions that catalyze changes in individual political attitudes, because
they are visible signals that the government is committed to a fair electoral process,
and that there are additional mechanisms in place to deter, detect, and sanction
instances of electoral fraud.
In addition to these criteria, however, the practicality of the case is important
for analytic purposes. In order to make assessments of how international election
monitoring affects individuals, there must be some indicators of individual feelings
that can be used for this purpose. For this reason, the cases that had both large
and expansive monitoring missions and sufficient data to make conclusions about the
effect of monitoring missions severely limited the number of potential cases. However,
one case, Ghana’s 2008 election, stood out both for the size and scope of the mission
and for its comparative potential. The 2008 national election was monitored by
a large mission from the European Union and electoral assistance and observation
was allocated to all ten electoral districts in the country (Commission, 2009).The
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EU mission arrived in Ghana on November 1, 2008 and stayed through January 24,
2009–a duration of nearly 90 days when the mean duration for all major electoral
monitoring missions is 24.2 days (Kelley, 2010). The mission was also quite large in
terms of the number of observers. The mean number, according to election monitoring
data gathered by Kelley (2010) is 28.9 observers per mission; Ghana’s first round
presidential election was observed by more than 70 observers, including observers in
each electoral district in the country (Commission, 2009).
Furthermore, the monitoring mission for the 2012 election, which was scheduled
to be deployed in November 2012, was cancelled last-minute in a press release from
the European Union saying that as an act of faith in Ghana’s democratic institutions,
the mission would not be deployed. As a result, the 2012 election was not monitored
by a major international organization, which is a rarity for elections in developing
democracies. For these reasons, Ghana is analyzed as the positive case. In addition to
this comparative potential, the selection of a single case to compare over time controls
for a host of variables that may otherwise affect outcomes, since those remain mostly
constant over time. In some ways, the selection of a single case with a monitored
and unmonitored election is like a natural experiment–the obvious variation is in the
presence of an international mission to observe domestic democratic processes.
In the case of international lending, a “most-likely” case is one where the lending
program is large and enduring enough that the loan is distributed in tranches, and
where the structural reforms mandated by the program are extensive. In addition
to these criteria, again, the theoretical interest of the case can play a part in case
selection. Here, the most obvious and likely case to fit these criteria is Greece, despite
the fact that the situation is as of yet unresolved. However, the lending program
there has been massive by historical international lending standards, the structural
and other reforms mandated by the program have been extensive, and the program
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has endured for more than five years. For these reasons, Greece is the case most likely
to exhibit the relationships and processes hypothesized in Chapter 2.
Beyond being an attractive case for this particular research strategy, the selection
of Greece has other notable benefits. One difficulty in studying these micro-level
effects is isolating the causal factor of interest (in this case, the governing intervention)
from other possible causal factors related to changes in individual level attitudes. In
the case of international lending, for example, the empirical expectation is that when
lending programs are employed in countries, they will negatively affect perceptions of
democracy because of the particular institutional features of the programs and how
they affect participation and influence at the individual level. However, as has been
well established in previous research, perceptions of democracy are also dependent on
economic conditions–when individuals perceive economic conditions to be bad, they
lose confidence in government and democracy, and vice versa (Kayser and Peress,
2012). Exacerbating the problem is that it is precisely in these economically difficult
times that lending programs are utilized. How can these separate effects be sorted
out?
Greece, like other members of the European Union, experienced a deep and pro-
longed economic recession beginning in 2008 and, in some places, continuing to the
present day. The economic recession did hit Greece somewhat harder in some senses
(unemployment, for example) but overall the magnitude of the recession was monu-
mental, especially for those members of the EU whose financial conditions were weak
to being with (Greece, Spain, and Italy, for example). However, Greece was the only
EU member state that required substantive and prolonged IMF intervention, and as
a result, can be compared to other EU states to try to isolate the effect of IMF lend-
ing programs from economic recession. This strategy is imperfect, of course, because
the economic conditions in Greece were necessarily worse than in other EU states.
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However, for gaining analytical leverage on this particular question, the strategy is
the most appropriate.
Electoral Monitoring in Ghana: A comparison of the 2008 and 2012 Presidential
Elections
Background
Ghana is a West African state that is considered to be one of Africa’s demo-
cratic successes (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009). After a series of power struggles between
civilian and military governments, in January 1993, the ruling military government
of Ghana ceded power to the Fourth Republic of Ghana and the leaders elected in late
1992. Since then, Ghana has had frequent and timely elections and has peacefully
transitioned between ruling and opposition parties twice, signaling a commitment to
democratic governance. At the presidential level, Ghana has a two-round voting sys-
tem where candidates must receive an absolute majority to avoid a run-off election.
For parliamentary elections, Ghana has a first-past-the-post system.
The Fourth Republic of Ghana was organized as a constitutional democracy with
an elected President that is both head of state and head of government. In addition to
the president of the republic, there is a 275-member parliament. Both the president
and members of parliament are elected to 4-year terms. Ghana is governed by two
major political parties, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), the major center-right party,
and the National Democratic Congress (NDC), a social democratic party. The NDC
has enjoyed more electoral success since the inaugural 1992 elections, winning four of
six national elections. However, the 1996 election led to a transition of power between
the NDC and the NPP in 1997 (the first successful instance of transitioning between
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major parties), and the NPP would remain in power until early 2009 after being voted
out in late 2008.
2008 Election
In the 2008 general election, the two major candidates were Nana Akufo-Addo for
the NPP and John Atta Mills for the NDC. In addition to these major candidates,
there were various other minor-party candidates that received relatively low levels
of support. However, one candidate Paa Kwesi Nduom of the Convention People’s
Party received enough support to potentially force a run-off election between the two
major candidates.
Like past elections in the state, the 2008 general election was monitored by the
European Union after being invited by the Ghana Electoral Commission. As with
other developing democracies, inviting electoral monitors sends a signal to citizens
and the international community that the election will be a legitimate expression of
political preferences in the state, and will result in the election of leaders through
a fair and transparent process (Kelley, 2008). In an independent report detailing
the 2008 elections, consulting firm Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung wrote “...elections obser-
vation was no doubt a major confidence boosting mechanism used by the Electoral
Commission...” (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010, 22).
Though there were several electoral monitoring missions, both international and
domestic, for the 2008 election, the largest of these missions was that of the European
Union. The EU mission arrived in Ghana on November 1, 2008 and stayed through
January 24, 2009–a duration of nearly 90 days when the mean duration for all major
electoral monitoring missions is 24.2 days (Kelley, 2010). This is in part due to
the two-stage electoral process when one presidential candidate does not achieve an
absolute majority in the first round, but it also represents the effort by the EU and
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Ghana to operate a high-quality election at a time when other African elections were
troubled (Commission, 2009; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010).
In addition to an extended duration in the country, the EU mission was also
quite large in terms of the number of observers. The mean number, according to
election monitoring data gathered by Kelley (2010) is 28.9 observers per mission;
Ghana’s first round presidential election was observed by more than 70 observers,
including observers in each electoral district in the country (Commission, 2009). The
presidential runoff had more than 50 observers. Thus, in terms of both duration and
size, the electoral observation mission to Ghana was among the largest.
Moreover, the mission was not only providing physical monitoring of voting and
counting processes, but also provided various forms of technical assistance before and
during the election to promote citizen participation and procedural efficiency. For
example, the monitoring mission was involved in promoting voting as a civic duty in an
attempt to encourage high voter turnout. This assistance took the form of advertising
campaigns in both print and electronic media that told voters about the election and
the steps to go through to become registered to participate (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung,
2010). Additionally, the monitoring mission shared responsibility with the Ghanaian
Electoral Commission for ensuring easy access to voter registration documents, and
ensuring that electoral officials were properly trained to assist citizens in this regard
(Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010).
EU mission officials also attended meetings between the electoral commission and
major party officials to help resolve disputes related to voter rolls. The NDC made ac-
cusations that the NPP was bloating the voter rolls by illegally registering individuals
who were not eligible to participate in the election (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010).
The Electoral Commission, with the assistance of EU officials, successfully resolved
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this disagreement between the two parties by making revisions to the list of eligible
voters, helping to prevent either party from boycotting the election as fraudulent.
In addition to direct observation of polling places and the ballot counting pro-
cedures, and these major technical assistance tasks noted previously, the electoral
mission also helped ensure that the candidate nomination processes were fair, that
disabled and incapacitated voters had access to polls, assisted in recruiting and train-
ing poll workers, and assisted with coordinating the delivery of official election mate-
rials (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010, 41-44). The mission, therefore, was important
to the logistical and procedural integrity of the election.
The first round election in the presidential race did not produce a candidate with a
majority, and therefore a runoff election was necessary between the top two candidates
to produce a winner. The runoff election was conducted on December 28, 2008 and
was executed according to plan with one exception. In one district, the Tain district,
logistical problems prevented the runoff election from being conducted. Exacerbating
this problem was the fact that the two candidates were separated by only 23,000
votes while the Tain district had 54,000 registered voters (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung,
2010, 45). Thus, the Electoral Commission and EU observation mission coordinated
to ensure that the runoff election would occur in the Tain district.
Ultimately, efforts from the Electoral Commission, the two major political parties,
and the EU electoral observation mission resulted in the runoff election being held
in the Tain district. After the results of the runoff election were included in the
nationwide totals, John Atta Mills of the NDC was declared the winner by a margin
of less than one percentage point. Atta Mills received approximately 4,521,000 total
votes, or 50.23 percent of the electorate, while Akufo-Addo received 4,480,000, 49.77
percent. It was the lowest margin of victory in Fourth Republic history, yet was
predominantly accepted as a legitimate and fair election by both the winning party,
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NDC, and the losing NPP, despite the fact that losing the election meant a transition
of power between the two (Commission, 2009; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2010). With
the inauguration of President Atta Mills in early 2009, Ghana marked its second
successful transition of power in the Fourth Republic.
2012 Election
There was no incumbent in the 2012 election, as sitting president Atta Mills,
elected in 2008, died in office in July 2012. His vice president, John Mahama was
the presidential candidate for the NDC and ran against Akufo-Addo of the NPP,
who previously ran unsuccessfully in 2008. Originally, the Electoral Commission had
invited several monitors to observe the electoral process as they had in 2008, including
the European Union. Close to the time of the election, however, the European Union
canceled the mission, writing in a press release that “...the EU would not monitor the
general election scheduled for December 7, 2012, as a mark of confidence in Ghana’s
electoral system...the EU had observed that Ghana had developed internal structures
and had the capacity to organize free, fair, transparent, and credible elections without
the monitoring of the international community,” (EU Press Release, 2012).
Thus, the 2012 was the first in Fourth Republic that was not monitored by a ma-
jor international organization. There were still domestic monitors present, but their
roles were more restricted in that they were strictly observers and did not provide
the same types of technical assistance that the 2008 EU electoral monitoring mis-
sion provided. Furthermore, domestic observers face problems of credibility, funding,
and inexperience which makes their assessments less credible in the eyes of national
and international audiences (Nevitte and Canton, 1997). Especially in developing
democracies where resources are limited and the network of NGOs is relatively small,
domestic observation missions tend to make decisions on a more ad hoc basis and are
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less capable at fully monitoring and assessing electoral integrity (ibid). Without the
experience and resources of an international electoral monitoring mission, the 2012
election was in uncharted territory for the Fourth Republic of Ghana.
The 2012 election experienced many of the same pre-election issues that the EU
observation mission helped to alleviate in 2008. For example, there were complaints
against media organizations that their coverage was favoring incumbent party NDC,
as the sitting president had died in July of 2012 and the media coverage focused
on who would be running for the party to succeed him (The Daily Telegraph 2012).
Additionally, there was again controversy over the voting rolls and the use of biometric
voting machines in the election that NPP party officials would not accurately count
votes (ibid). However, without the technical assistance of the EU electoral monitors
to broker compromises on these issues, they remained salient until the election and
were cited as issues when votes were tallied and the incumbent party’s candidate Vice
President John Mahama, won a majority in the first round of voting with 50.7 percent
of the vote, beating NPP’s candidate Afuko-Addo by nearly three full percentage
points and more than six times the margin of victory in the 2008 election.
The electoral process and the results of the election were considered to be free and
fair by domestic observers, but were rejected immediately by the major opposition
party NPP. NPP party officials claimed there were major voting irregularities, partic-
ular with regard to the use of the biometric voting machines, and made accusations
against the electoral commission of favoring the NDC. For example, in a press release
after the election, the NPP wrote, “The ruling NDC conspired with certain EC staff
in constituencies across the country to falsify the election results and thereby abuse
the mandate of the people of Ghana,” (Party, 2012). The party considered options
for challenging the election results, including lodging complaints with the national
Supreme Court, but officially ruled out violent opposition (BBC, 2012). Despite this
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rejection of violence from NPP leadership, however, there were still major opposi-
tion protests in the capital where police used tear gas to control and disperse the
crowds. Additionally, tanks guarded the Electoral Commission for fear that opposi-
tion protesters would attempt to vandalize or otherwise damage the building or any
of the Electoral Commission Members (BBC, 2012).
Comparing Ghana’s 2008 and 2012 Elections
In addition to the methodological advantages of choosing Ghana for the case study,
there are practical advantages as well. Public opinion surveys were conducted asking
about attitudes towards various democratic institutions, including the ones of interest
here–namely, government, parliament, and political parties. While the surveys did
not consistently ask about feeling of electoral fairness, which would be of particular
interest here, the surveys do consistently ask about the dependent variables of interest
to this study, which are related to levels of confidence in democracy.
One challenge of linking electoral monitoring with individual attitudes is that
much of the technical and professional assistance that electoral monitoring missions
provide to states is behind the scenes. The only visible aspects of the monitoring mis-
sion are the invitation form the Electoral Commission, which is announced publicly,
and the physical presence of observers at polling locations on election day. However,
the technical and professional assistance does impact individual perceptions of elec-
toral fairness through party leaders. Many of the pre-election complains were resolved
with the assistance of the EU and the Electoral Commission, and the solutions were
mutually agreeable to party leaders and candidates. Thus, this professional and tech-
nical assistance created conditions where the losing candidate and party (in 2008, the
NPP) were willing to accept the results of the election because they perceived the
process to be free and fair. In the absence of this technical and professional assistance,
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as in 2012, it is more difficult to solve these types of issues in ways that both parties
agree to, and thus, makes it more likely that party officials and candidates denounce
or even boycott the election as a result. This is precisely what happened in the 2012
election, and thus supporters of the NPP heard public renunciations of the electoral
process and the results as being rigged by the NDC, which created conditions where
individuals lost confidence in the electoral process.
All of these mechanisms are impossible to empirically isolate with the available
data. However, consistent with the purpose of this chapter, it is possible to determine
whether these causal processes are plausible, and whether they merit further inves-
tigation. In addition to the cross-national statistical evidence provided in previous
chapters, significant differences between individual attitudes toward democratic insti-
tutions in the 2008 and 2012 Ghanian elections would further support the plausibility
of the theory. More specifically, I expect the following empirical relationships:
• Individual levels of satisfaction with democracy and perceptions of electoral
fairness will be significantly higher after the 2008 election than after the 2012
election, without regard to party affiliation.
• The difference in levels of confidence between 2008 and 2012 will be greater for
individuals that identify with the NPP than those that identify with the NDC.
This is because leaders from both parties, including the NPP despite having lost,
accepted the electoral results in 2008 in the presence of international monitors.
The NPP also lost the election in 2012, but made claims of widespread electoral
fraud. Thus, I expect that the 2012 election results would have stronger effects
on individuals that identify with the NPP than those that identify with the
NDC.
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• Some of the strongest evidence more directly related to the effect of the presence
of electoral monitors would be if there were no significant differences between
levels of confidence in democratic institutions for individuals identifying with
the NDC compared to those identifying with the NPP in 2008, and a significant
difference between the two groups in the 2012 survey. Assuming that technical
and observational assistance during elections can lead to greater acceptance of
the results regardless of the outcome, a credible electoral monitoring mission
could have potentially helped to broker solutions between the two major par-
ties when complaints about the electoral process were made. In this way, the
presence of monitors may have helped to alleviate the conditions that led to the
NPP’s rejection of the 2012 electoral results.
Analysis and Results
To determine the extent of the differences in public opinion both between groups
of individuals in the same election, specifically those identifying with the two major
parties, and between elections, I rely on the BEST test developed by Kruschke (2013).
The BEST test is a Bayesian alternative to the traditional t-test that improves the
ability to estimate the statistical power of effect sizes and is better at handling outlying
observations (Kruschke, 2013). Additionally, because the estimation procedure using
a large number of simulations to provide complete distributions for credible effect
sizes, the magnitude of the differences is more precise than in standard t-test results.
The data come from waves 5 and 6 of the Afrobarometer, which specifically ask
about attitudes toward the 2008 and 2012 elections, respectively. There are some
questions directly related to the election, like whether an individual participated
in the election, and their assessment of how free and fair the elections were. In
addition to these questions, the survey also asks about levels of confidence in various
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democratic institutions, which are the focus of this analysis. Empirically, however,
I expect that 2008 elections had higher voter turnout, and that individuals will feel
that the election was significantly more free and fair than the 2012 election.
The limitations of this type of analysis should be noted. Though the estimation
procedure may produce credible differences between groups, the reasons for that cred-
ible difference are not identified. This chapter has worked to provide a description
of how the conditions created by the presence and absence of large and professional
electoral monitoring missions in 2008 and 2012, respectively, may have contributed
to individual perceptions of the electoral process. However, more work will remain to
identify exactly how strong these causal relationships are, if possible, and to deter-
mine when these effects are most likely to be present in electoral contexts. The work
here is still valuable, however, in that it comprehensively theorizes the connections
between supranational forces and individual political involvement.
The first hypothesis above suggested that individual levels of satisfaction with
democracy and perceptions of electoral fairness would be higher after the 2008 election
than after the 2012 election, without accounting for party affiliation. Satisfaction
with democracy is measured on a four-point scale from “not at all satisfied” to “very
satisfied.” After 20,000 simulations, the average difference in means is 0.33 (mean
satisfaction after 2008 election 2.90, mean satisfaction after 2012 election 2.57). The
effect is credibly different from zero, with the 95 percent highest density interval
ranging from 0.03 to 0.61 points. The results for all tests are presented in Table 1.
When broken down by those that identify with either of the two major parties,
an interesting pattern emerges; despite their party winning both the 2008 and 2012
elections, individuals that identify with the NDC still experienced a credible difference
in their levels of satisfaction with democracy from after the monitored 2008 election
to after the 2012 election. NDC supporters lost, on average 0.24 points, with the
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95 percent highest density interval ranging between 0.13 and 0.34 points. However,
individuals that identify with the losing party, NPP, lost on average 0.47 points, with
the 95 percent highest density interval ranging between 0.37 and 0.57 points. Thus,
the evidence is clear that despite having a much higher margin of victory in 2012,
both NDC and NPP supporters were less satisfied with democracy, though for those
identifying with the losing NPP party, the effect was more than twice as large than
for those who identified with the victorious NDC.
Regarding perceptions of electoral fairness, the results show similar trends. Per-
ceptions of electoral fairness are also measured on a four-point scale from “not free
and fair” to “completely free and fair.” Without regard to party affiliation, individ-
uals lost on average 0.51 points on the four point scale when comparing perceptions
of fairness between the 2008 and 2012 elections, with the 95 percent highest density
interval 0.21 to 0.79 points. When taking party affiliation into account, NDC sup-
porters lost on average 0.19 points between the 2008 and 2012 elections, with the
95 percent highest density interval -0.01 and 0.49 points. For NPP supporters, this
effect was five times stronger, losing an average of 1.28 points (on a four point scale)
between the 2008 and 2012 elections, with the 95 percent highest density interval
ranging from 1.03 to 1.54 points.
When comparing supporters of the two major parties in 2008 and 2012, the results
are also supportive of the hypothesis proposed above. In 2008, the average score
for individuals who identify with the winning party NDC on the when asked about
perceptions of electoral fairness was 3.42 on a four point scale, meaning the average
fell between perceiving the election as “mostly free and fair” and “completely free
and fair.” For those that identified with the losing NPP, the average score was 3.15
points, also falling between “mostly free and fair” and “completely free and fair.”
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The difference between these two groups in 2008 was 0.27 points, with the 95 percent
highest density interval ranging from .09 to .45 points.
When comparing these two groups after the 2012 election, the difference between
them grows to 1.42 points, with the 95 percent highest density interval ranging from
1.13 to 1.69 points. In 2012, individuals who identified with the NDC reported an
average of 3.2 points when asked about perceptions of electoral fairness, credibly lower
than the average response for NDC identifiers in 2008. For those that identified with
the NPP, the average response was just 1.83 points on a four point scale, a significant
departure both from their perceptions of the monitored 2008 election and from the
average individual that identifies with the NDC in 2012.
What the evidence shows supports the theory and empirical expectations posited
earlier. Individuals were far more satisfied with both the freeness and fairness of the
2008 election, and with democracy overall after the 2008 election than after the 2012
election. These results are especially surprising given the historically narrow margin
of victory in 2008 (less than one percent difference between the candidates) and the
electoral irregularities in the runoff election. These results help to show that electoral
monitoring may positively affect individual perceptions of electoral fairness and levels
of satisfaction with democracy.
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International Lending in Greece
Background and Timeline
Although the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and European Central Bank
(ECB) did not intervene with a financial bailout in Greece until early 2010, the
origins of the financial crisis were much earlier. At the latest, major problems began
in 2004 when Greece spent a record 7 billion euros on the 2004 Summer Olympics
(BBC, 2004). Even before 2004, however, the Greek government routinely incurred
budget deficits as a result of spending on defense, social programs, and public pensions
(Dempsey, 2013). Before the 2007-08 financial crisis, the Greek government was able
to service this debt through a relatively strong bond market and lending from other
European Union member banks, though their debt levels were higher that EU average
(Eurostat, 2015).
Even before the major global recession, the Greek government recognized the
precarious nature of their economic situation. After the resignation of Greek Prime
Minister and socialist party PASOK’s leader, Kostas Simitis, elections were sched-
uled for early 2004. Though PASOK has been in power for nearly a decade, the
dramatically spending for the upcoming Olympic Games coupled with criticism from
the conservative New Democracy party undermined the popularity of PASOK leader-
ship, leading to electoral defeat in March 2004. The New Democracy party ran on a
platform of fiscal responsibility, with promises to reduce spending, pare down wages
and benefits for government workers, and minimize the high debt burden the country
had faced for over a decade.
Even before the recession and Greek financial crisis, New Democracy’s economic
agenda was wildly unpopular with public workers. In December 2005, transportation
workers and others employed by the government went on strike to oppose parliamen-
127
tary changes to the public tenure system (BBC, 2015). In March 2006, public workers
went on strike again to protest privatization of some government enterprises and fur-
ther changes to job security laws in the country (ibid). Thus, even before the major
global recession, Greek citizens were already dealing with economic hardship, partic-
ularly those employed in the public sector, and popularity of the new conservative
government eroded shortly after its election in 2004. Further, when the recession hit in
early 2008, these fiscal and political pressures only worsened, and public confidence
in the ruling New Democracy government fell to an all-time low, when 66 percent
of respondents reported that they “tend not to trust” their government (Eurostat,
2008). In the midst of these protests and social disruption, New Democracy’s leader,
and Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis called snap elections for October 2009.
The socialist PASOK party was elected to lead and George Papandreau took over as
Prime Minister.
One negative side effect of the global recession was that capital markets became
inaccessible to the Greek government because of its precarious financial situation and
because of the major losses already sustained by lending institutions. Until this point,
the Greek government had relied on bond financing to sustain its deficit spending,
but bond markets were weak during the recession and the Greek government could no
longer use them as an easy access to capital. As a result, Greece had excessive debt
and was still engaging in deficit spending, but there were no mechanisms to ensure the
Greek economy would remain economically viable. Thus, shortly after taking power,
the ruling PASOK party was faced with a downgrade in Greece’s credit rating, further
straining their already constrained resources and ability to raise capital to service the
national debt (BBC, 2015).
The New Democracy party lost power in the 2009 elections primarily because
of their economic reform agenda (BBC, 2015). There were mass protests and strikes
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against reforms pursued by the party, and these reforms were unpopular with citizens.
Thus, many citizens had high hopes for electing the socialist PASOK party back into
power, believing that their economic agenda would focus less on privatization and
spending cuts, and more on enforcing tax laws on wealthy citizens and looking for
new sources of revenue. However, shortly after election, recognizing the disaster on
the horizon, PASOK leadership and Prime Minister Papandreou announced two more
rounds of austerity measures which were met immediately with widespread protests
and strikes (BBC, 2015).
Greece was not the only European Union country facing economic hardship at
this time. Though Greece was the most likely candidate for debt default due to the
magnitude of its debt level and its inability to access capital markets, Spain, Ireland,
Portugal and Italy were in dangerous situations as well and experts feared that a de-
fault by any one of these countries would lead to a domino-effect default and threaten
the integrity of the currency union (ECB, 2010). Importantly for the purposes of this
chapter, the recessions in each of these countries (and in most countries in the world)
were more serious than any since the Great Depression; in other words, differences
in changes in attitudes towards government and other institutions in these states is
puzzling–if something other than poor economic performance and harsh austerity cuts
is causing changes in attitudes, which happened to similar degrees in each county in
the EU, what is it? I now turn an investigation of my primary argument by looking
at the IMF intervention in Greece to explain why changes in attitudes toward gov-
ernment, parliament, and political parties were much more severe in Greece than in
other EU countries.
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Multilateral Lending in Greece
Shortly after the election of the socialist PASOK party and their announcement of
two additional austerity programs, the IMF and European Union expressed concern
about the ability for Greece to handle its debt problem without assistance. As a result,
in May 2010, the Eurozone countries and the IMF collectively agreed to partner to
provide financial assistance to Greece, on the condition that the austerity programs
Greece was considering be considerably expanded to achieve specific fiscal targets in
under three years (IMF, 2013a). The original agreement was co-funded by the IMF
and the European Central Bank and, like most IMF programs, came with a set of
structural reform benchmarks that would need to be implemented in order for the
Greek government to continue receiving loan funds.
The structural benchmarks were primarily focused on public spending and in-
cluded reforms like reducing public wages and pensions, privatizing government-
owned industries with the goal to raise a billion euros annually, increasing the value-
added tax to 23 percent, reorganizing and consolidating local government units to
reduce the number of public employees, passing legislation to reform the collective
bargaining rights of public employees, and committing to only replace 20 percent of
public employees who left or retired (IMF, 2013a). These reforms were particularly
ambitious in scope, but the socialist party had no viable alternative, because in the
midst of the recession, Greek banks were being threatened with liquidity issues and
had no reserved funds to cover debt obligations in the short term (IMF, 2013a).
In response to the original bailout package, trade unions and other public sector
unions protested en masse, calling on the socialist government to reject the deal
and instead focus on debt forgiveness agreements. However, the government went
forward with the terms of the lending agreement, though the IMF reports that the
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administration was not fully buying into their vision and, as a result, were only
minimally effective in implementing the required reforms (IMF, 2013a). However,
with each additional round of austerity (implemented in rounds because the funding
is disbursed according to progress in achieving performance benchmarks), protests and
dissent against the Greek government and the IMF grew. In June 2011, for example,
public workers launched a 24-hour strike and tens of thousands of protesters marched
on parliament to oppose further IMF reforms (BBC (2015)).
Even amidst the protests and strong opposition, PASOK leaders with New Democ-
racy support were doing their best to adhere to the terms of the lending arrangement.
Each party recognized that there were no viable alternatives to IMF lending, because
credit markets were still inaccessible, Greece’s credit ratings had been downgraded to
reflect their significant risk of default, and systemic internal pressures were evermore
increasing. For example, deposits in the Greek banking system had declined over 20
percent from January 2010 to the end of 2011, falling from nearly 238 billion euros
to less than 189 billion (ECB, 2014). Citizens were afraid that the government would
resort to mandatory levies on bank deposits, or were afraid that a debt default would
make their deposits inaccessible, and thus were taking money out of the system for
safekeeping in their homes (Der Spiegel, 2011).
However, the economic problems in Greece were much more severe than originally
anticipated, in part because austerity policies directed at reducing public debt and
because of the extent of the global financial crisis that affected other EU members in
addition to Greece. Thus, Greece required another bailout. In addition to continuing
austerity packages six separate parliamentary acts from 2010 to 2012 the EU and
IMF agreed to a new bailout package to finance short-term loan payments for Greece.
Total assistance would not be 246 billion euros by 2016. The continued austerity and
the government’s willingness to continue to pursue these policies in spite of widespread
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and intense public opposition created tense conditions in the country. For example,
in early 2012, a retired pharmacist committed suicide near Greece’s parliament to
protest further austerity measures that had been approved.
Politically, the period after the first bailout saw several different governments
trying to manage the relationship with the EU-IMF lending partners while simul-
taneously attempting to placate public opinion about the lending program and the
required austerity measures. For example, in 2011 Prime Minister Papandreou called
a vote of confidence and a referendum to approve the newly negotiated summit deal
where the lending partners made concessions to Greece to accept write-offs on out-
standing debt for their continued participation in austerity programs. However, the
referendum idea was opposed by EU leadership and was criticized by Papandreou’s
own minister of finance. As a result of pressure from these areas, Papandreou called
off the referendum. Though Papandreou won the vote of confidence in parliament, he
resigned two days later when opposition parties refused to join a governing coalition
if Papandreou insisted on remaining Prime Minister. For this reason, he resigned and
the new coalition government between New Democracy and PASOK was headed by
Lucas Papademos.
The government was short-lived, however, because the coalition fell apart and
elections were held in May 2012. New Democracy again won the election, but with a
narrower margin of victory than in past elections and with fewer seats in parliament.
Additionally, the fringe-left party Syriza continued to gain support for their popular
anti-austerity platform. With the narrow margin of victory, New Democracy was
unable to form a government. A temporary government was established under the
leadership of Panagiotis Pikrammenos. Elections were held again in June 2012 where
the New Democracy led with nearly 30 percent of the popular vote, and this time were
132
able to form a coalition government with PASOK and the Democratic Left DIMAR.
Antonis Samaras, the president of New Democracy, became the new Prime Minister.
Samaras’ tenure as Prime Minister was tenuous for the same reasons that drove
Papandreou to resign. There was increasing pressure from IMF and EU officials to
continue implementing tough austerity measures that were extremely unpopular with
the electorate. For example, in October 2012, the Samaras government supported and
passed an austerity package that included laying off 15,000 additional public sector
employees, a 22 percent reduction in the national minimum wage, a pension and wage
freeze for five years, and deep cuts to public sector services including the Ministry of
Health which primarily affected the services they were able to provide to the poorest
Greeks (IMF, 2013a).
Ultimately, public disaffection with the continued engagement with IMF-EU offi-
cials at the expense of the Greek electorate and Samaras lost a vote in parliament to
approve the New Democracy candidate for President, largely a ceremonial position.
Thus, constitutionally mandated snap elections were held in January 2015 where the
fringe and anti-austerity party Syriza won the election and was charged with forming
a government. Reflecting the sentiment of the electorate, the coalition agreement for
the Syriza government, headed by Alexis Tsipras, noted that the government would
respect Greece’s status as a Eurozone member and would thus fulfill its obligations
to other EU members, but would have the ability to determine how those obligations
would be met. Importantly, the coalition agreement specifically ruled out further
austerity measures as tools that would be used (The Irish Times, 2015).
Despite these electoral promises from the Syriza coalition, the Tsipras government
has given into the demands of the IMF and other European creditors, and has passed
further austerity measures in order to continue receiving emergency loan funding.
This reversal has led to resentment and anger among Greek voters who specifically
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supported the Syriza party for their strong stance against further austerity measures,
even if it meant leaving the European Union. For example, a recent news article
quotes a young voter who says “[Prime Minister] Alexis [Tsipras] betrayed us. Syriza
has done everything it said it wouldn’t.” (Lee, 2015).
Analysis and Results
The cross-national results presented in Chapter 4 suggested that individuals in
states more dependent on international lending programs were less confident in gov-
ernment, parliament, and political parties, after controlling for economic conditions
and a host of other variables related to these outcome variables. In the case of Greece
specifically, these outcomes are difficult to measure because there is no pre- and post-
lending program data to be compared to try to determine the magnitude of an effect.
Also complicating matters is the fact that an economic recession should also cause
changes to levels of confidence in democratic institutions, because individuals are less
satisfied with the outputs of their government (Inglehart, 2000).
However, Greece was not the only county that experienced a deep and prolonged
recession from late 2007 to present day, nor the only country to face pressure to rely
on international lending programs for relief. All countries in the European Union
experienced recession to a significant degree both in scope and time, and thus help
to serve as a good benchmark for evaluating the effects of economic recession from
the effects of economic recession and the institutions of international lending pro-
grams. In other words, if economic recession were the reason for declining levels of
trust in various democratic institutions, many EU economies experienced economic
contraction at a rate similar to Greece, though the precariousness of their short-term
debt problems were less severe. However, to individuals in the countries, recession
meant high unemployment, cuts to wages and government benefits, and reductions in
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services provided by the states—and these affected Greece and other states to similar
degrees before the international lending program was put in place.
Thus, one empirical expectation is that Greece should diverge from the rest of
the EU with regard to their levels of trust in democratic institutions. This is for
two reasons: First, these institutions, particularly parliament, are responsible for im-
plementing the policies that led to changes in quality of life for individuals; second,
and perhaps more importantly, even when individuals expressed their political prefer-
ences against the activities of the government, making clear that they were opposed
to the austerity measures that were being put in place and voted to reflect these
preferences, there was no substantive change in the way that government worked,
because the government was accountable to IMF officials rather than their voting
constituency.
There are at least two major democratic events that, under normal circumstances,
should have changed the course of government policy, but did not. The first was the
2009 snap elections that led to the removal of New Democracy party from power,
which had been implementing a strong economic reform agenda to try to avoid emer-
gency lending measured. There was widespread opposition to the economic platform
of the New Democracy party, and the socialist PASOK party ran on a platform against
these economic reforms, instead promising to improve economic conditions by enforc-
ing tax laws on the wealthy. However, shortly after being elected, PASOK, led by
Prime Minister Papandreou was responsible for negotiating the first several rounds
of austerity, which were also the most severe, during the height of the recession.
The second major democratic even that should have changed the course of gov-
ernment policy was the election of the left-wing Syriza party and Prime Minister
Alexis Tsipras in January 2015. Syriza ran specifically on an agenda against further
austerity measures, even if it meant leaving the EU altogether. However, as with the
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first event, there was no credible alternative to accepting the demands of the IMF
and EU lenders. While it is too early to have data on the 2015 event, the empirical
expectation would be a short-term boost in levels of trust after the election of Syriza,
followed by a sharp rise in distrust when no meaningful changes occurred under the
new government.
The data come from the EuroBarometer Trend Questions, which is a survey that
asks a series of questions to track trends over time. The EuroBarometer Trend ques-
tions are asked in each EU country on annually and measure attitudes towards vari-
ous common socio-cultural and socio-political orientations such that changes can be
tracked more or less over time, and can be tracked more frequently than possible if
relying on the full Eurobarometer survey. The data is available only at the coun-
try level, but is useful here for seeing the trends over time which correspond to the
empirical expectations of the theory. Looking at levels of trust in government, par-
liament, and political parties, the data shows that while Grecians were always more
distrustful of democratic institutions than their EU counterparts, the gap in levels
of trust has exaggerated over time. For example, Figure 1 shows levels of trust in
government, and plots the percentage of individuals answering ”Tend not to trust.”
In October 2007, more Greeks trusted their government than in other EU counties,
with approximately 55 percent of Greeks tending not to trust their government com-
pared to nearly 60 percent in the EU more generally. However, by late 2014, nearly
90 percent of Greeks answered that they tend not to trust government, with just
over 60 percent answering the same way in the EU more generally (See Figure 5.1).
The only exception to this trend is when attitudes were measured in November 2009,
just after the ouster of New Democracy, where there was a temporary regaining of
trust followed by a very sharp increase in levels of distrust once PASOK and Prime
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Minister Papandreou implemented the same times of austerity and economic reform
that voters voted against in the 2009 elections.
Levels of trust in parliament exhibit a similar trend. In October 2007, there was
less than a 10 percent difference between Greeks and individuals in other EU states
expressing distrust with their national parliament, with 56 percent of Greeks and 48
percent of individuals in other EU states answering that they tend not to trust their
national parliament. By late 2014, this gap had increased to 22 percentage points,
with 83 percent of Greeks tending not to trust their national parliament compared
with 61 percent of individuals in other EU states. Again their is a brief period of
increased trust in November 2009 after the ouster of New Democracy, which quickly
erodes in subsequent periods (See Figure 5.2). Trust in political parties exhibits a
similar relationship, with the difference between Greeks and other EU states going
from four percentage points in October 2007 to more nearly 15 percentage points in
late 2014 (See Figure 5.3).
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Figure 5.1: Trust in Government: Greece vs. EU
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Figure 5.2: Trust in Parliament: Greece vs. EU
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Figure 5.3: Trust in Political Parties: Greece vs. EU
Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter has used the cases of electoral monitoring in Ghana and international
lending in Greece to show that the theory proposed in Chapter 2 linking macro-
level institutions with changes in micro-level attitudes have sufficient foundation. In
other words, this chapter was an exploratory investigation to see whether changes in
individual level attitudes could be convincingly linked to the institutions associated
with international governing assistance programs. While this investigation did not
provide direct causal evidence in this regard, it did test various empirical expectations
to show that changes in micro-level attitudes are consistent with the predictions of
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the theory proposed in Chapter 2, and that these changes in attitudes are not fully
accounted for by other explanations for changes in individual political attitudes.
In the case of Ghana, all individuals were less satisfied with democracy and per-
ceived the unmonitored election as less free and fair than the monitored one, even
those individuals that identified with the winning party in both cases. Moreover,
the margin of victory in the unmonitored 2012 election was more than 5 times larger
than the margin of victory in the monitored 2008 election, and the 2008 election came
down to a runoff in a single district that experienced electoral irregularities. I argue
that the presence of the EU electoral monitoring mission provided assistance that
helped broker solutions to pre-election disagreements between the two major parties,
and in doing so helped to ensure that party leadership would accept the outcome of
the election, even if their party lost. Additionally, the presence of electoral monitors
at polling stations served as a visible signal to individuals that there were mechanisms
to detect and sanction fraud. Finally, the symbolism of inviting a monitor to oversee
the electoral process sends signals to citizens that the government is committed to
a free and fair electoral process. In the absence of these institutions that support
existing democratic institutions in the state, the electoral process was less credible
and perceived less favorably by all individuals, even when the election results favored
their preferred candidate.
In the case of international lending in Greece, this chapter showed that over
time, individuals became less trustworthy of democratic institutions, in particular
government, parliament, and political parties, and that these changes in attitudes
corresponded with a long and invasive lending program. Some anecdotal evidence
suggested voter apathy, particularly with the political process, and this trend was
evident in the opinion data over time which showed brief periods of increased levels
of trust after a major shift in party control, but this increased trust quickly dissipated
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after no substantive change to governing took place. While it is too early to have
data on the January 2015 election, I would expect again a brief period of increased
trust following the election of the left-wing Syriza party, followed by a sharp increase
in levels of distrust when Syriza broke its campaign promises and implemented the
economic reforms demanded by the IMF. In short, there is no alternative in Greece,
and the institutions of the international lending program have rendered the demo-
cratic institutions in Greece totally ineffective for individuals trying to articulate their
political demands.
These cases are only two examples of the ways in which international lending pro-
grams can affect individual political attitudes. However, they have major implications
for the prospects of democratic consolidation in these countries, particularly in cases
where international governing assistance creates conditions where democracy is inef-
fective for citizens in a particular state. This chapter and the previous two chapters
have shown evidence that governing assistance programs can affect individual atti-
tudes toward democracy, and having individuals vested in the idea that democracy
is a good form of government is essential for its long-term success.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSIONS
International organizations have taken on a more active role in domestic governance
activities in the last several decades. The two examples considered in this project,
international election monitoring and international lending, have become common
features of domestic governing systems particularly in developing democratic countries
where they are used to supplement existing governing capacity. More than 80 percent
of elections in developing democracies are monitored by an international organization
and some developing countries have relied heavily on international lending programs,
particularly in times of economic hardship. However, these forms of assistance have
consequences, both for the target state and for the individuals being governed within
it. The central focus of this project has been theorizing and empirically substantiating
the connections between international governing assistance and individuals political
attitudes.
Understanding the connections between international governing assistance and
individuals political attitudes is essential for fully accounting for the causes and con-
ditions necessary for democratic consolidation. Levels of confidence in democratic
institutions as well as feeling that institutions are responsive to popular demands is
essential for consolidating democratic governance over the long term (Inglehart and
Welzel 2006). However, international governing assistance can affect how individu-
als respond to their domestic democratic landscape and can affect the motivations
for choosing to participate in or abstain from political activity through traditional
democratic channels. Recall the example of present day Greece, where despite hav-
ing frequent elections and stark changes in the ideology and political platform of the
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governing coalition, there were no substantive difference between the coalition that
supported austerity politics demanded by the IMF and the coalition that claimed not
to. Both coalitions continued implementing wildly unpopular austerity packages in
order to continue receiving emergency loan funds. Traditional democratic channels
have been ineffective in changing the course of policy in Greece, and individuals have
resorted to contentious political activities to make their demands known.
By exploring these connections theoretically and empirically, this project makes a
number of important contributions. First, it provides good evidence that international
governing assistance programs can and do affect the ways that individuals feel about
their political system. Furthermore, there are good theoretical reasons to expect that
these effects will also manifest in an individual’s decision about whether and how to
participate in political activity. For example, in the cases where international electoral
monitoring is robust and effective, individuals may be more likely to vote if they feel
that there are strong mechanisms in place to detect and deter fraud–in other words,
they may be more likely to participate in the electoral process when they feel like
their vote will count. Conversely, as in Greece, when democratic institutions become
unresponsive to popular demands, individuals may be less motivated to participate
in traditional forms of political activity and resort to contentious politics to affect
change. What this means at a more general theoretical level is that understanding
how individuals feel about politics and why they make particular decisions about their
involvement requires consider not only individual and domestic-level factors, but also
the influence of international forces that affect their day-to-day life.
The theory in Chapter 2 argued that determining how international governing
assistance will affect individuals primarily depends on whether the institutions asso-
ciated with the governing intervention reinforce or compete with existing democratic
institutions in the state. In the cases of international electoral monitoring, explored
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in Chapters 3 and 5, I showed that the institutions associated with these missions
reinforce existing democratic institutions in the state, and as a result, generally have
a positive effect on individual political attitudes. For example, electoral monitoring
missions provide additional visible signals to citizens (in the form of poll monitors)
that the state is committed to a free and fair electoral process, that there are mech-
anisms in place to ensure the electoral process works effectively, and that there are
mechanisms to detect and deter fraud. In this way, electoral monitoring missions
help individuals to feel more confident in the electoral process. The empirical results
support this expectation.
In cases where international governing assistance competes with existing demo-
cratic institutions, the opposite effect should materialize. Chapters 4 and 5 used cases
of international lending, both in a cross national context and in present day Greece to
show that the institutions associated with international lending programs frequently
compete with existing democratic institutions in the states where the lending pro-
grams are deployed, which created a system where political leaders in the state face
incentives to be accountable to lending program officials rather than the constituents
to which they are ostensibly accountable. In these cases, individuals cannot effec-
tively make political demands through traditional channels and lose confidence in the
system more generally.
This project also speaks to the debate about the effect of international institu-
tions on democratic governance. Rather than arguing that international institutions
are good or bad for domestic democracy in a general sense, this project shows that
whether they are positive or negative influences depends. In other words, interna-
tional interventions in domestic politics is no ex ante good or bad for states. Rather,
whether the intervention has positive or negative effects of state depends on the de-
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sign and implementation of the intervention itself and how it supports or undermines
existing institutions in the state.
That leads to a related but more substantive contribution, which is that this work
suggests that to help the spread of democracy, it is essential to consider not only
whether to assist states with governing problems, but how that assistance should be
delivered. This work shows that when the international governing program has strong
accountability enforcement for states, as with international lending programs, the in-
stitutions associated with the program supplant democracy (even if only temporarily)
which does long-term damage to democratic prospects in the state in question. When
designing international governing assistance programs, it is essential to balance the
goals of the international community with the goals of the target state to ensure that
governing assistance does not harm the long term prospects for democratic consoli-
dation.
Major Findings
Though the theory here generalizes to many different types of international gov-
erning assistance programs, this project looked in particular at electoral monitoring
missions and international lending programs as positive and negative cases. In positive
cases, the expectation is that because the institutions associated with the governing
assistance reinforce existing democratic institutions in the state, those types of gov-
erning assistance should yield positive effects on individual perceptions of democratic
institutions. In negative cases, the expectation is that programs will negatively impact
individual perceptions toward democracy, because the institutions associated with the
governing programs change the political landscape in which individuals make political
demands. In this project, cross-national and case-study evidence solidly links inter-
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national governing assistance programs to changes in individual political attitudes.
These changes materialize through both direct and indirect effects.
There are two sets of direct effects that may link international governing assistance
programs with individual political attitudes. The first is what I called the direct
procedural effect, or the effect that occurs when international governing programs
affect the process by which political decisions are made. For example, in cases of
international election monitoring, the direct procedural effect would be activated
by the pre-election technical assistance missions sometimes provide to states (voter
registration, determining the location of polls, etc). In the case of international
election monitoring, the direct procedural effect is most visible in the ways that an
alternate chain of accountability affects the political calculus of leaders.
The second type of direct effect is the direct symbolic effect, which is the effect
that materializes when states send signals to citizens that trigger emotive responses.
For example, as explored in more detail in Chapter 5, Ghana used the invitation
of an election monitor as a signal to citizens and the international community that
the state was committed to a free and fair electoral process. Conversely, in the case
of international lending programs, relying on the resources of an international body
conveys messages of inept leadership and thus may create conditions where citizens
lose trust in the current administration and government more generally for getting
the state into such an economic crisis to begin with.
Finally, the theory posits an indirect effect, which is the effect that materializes
through changes in policy and outcomes that would not have occurred in the absence
of the international governing assistance. In the case of Ghana’s monitored 2008
election, a good example of this indirect effect is the compromises brokered between
the two competing parties with the assistance of the election monitoring officials.
In the 2012 election, many of the same disagreements between parties occurred, but
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there was no intermediary that was successfully able to negotiate solutions that would
be accepted by both parties’ leadership, and as a result these conflict went unresolved
and ultimately resulted in the NPP boycotting the 2012 electoral results.
It is important to note that empirical chapters of this project did not try to isolate
any of these effects, in part because of the difficulty in doing so with available data,
and in part because each of these effects works simultaneously to shape individual
attitudes. This project is a first attempt to theoretically and empirically link interna-
tional governing assistance programs with individual political attitudes and as such
was more focused on substantiating these linkages in a general sense than it was in
providing specific estimates of the size and relative influence of each effect.
In the case of electoral monitoring, the cross-national evidence shows that electoral
monitoring mission affect individual perceptions of electoral fairness and satisfaction
with democracy. Both the size and duration of the monitoring mission significantly
impact individual attitudes. This is because the physical presence of electoral are
visible reminders that there are mechanisms to detect and deter fraud in the electoral
process. Additionally, the presence of electoral monitors sends signals to citizens
that the government is committed to a free and fair electoral process, which may
inspire confidence in the process more generally. In the case of Ghana’s 2008 election,
the role of the electoral monitor went beyond observing the electoral process. The
mission also provided critical technical assistance and acted as broker between party
officials when disagreements occurred. With the help of the electoral monitoring
mission, even though the election was decided by a very narrow margin, leaders
in both parties accepted the process and the results as fair. In 2012 by contrast,
many of the same disagreements occurred between parties, but there was no electoral
monitoring mission to negotiate solutions that satisfied both parties. As a result,
despite a much wider margin of victory in the 2012 election, the NPP boycotted the
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results of the election and conveyed to party members that the process was rigged.
By supporting the existing democratic institutions in Ghana, the electoral monitoring
mission played an important role in a successful and credible electoral process, and
individual perceptions reflected this.
In the case of international lending, however, the picture complicates. Interna-
tional organizations have an incentive to design lending programs such that states
may be held accountable and such that they can be reasonably certain that the state
will be able to repay the emergency loan funds. However, designing programs in
this way also carries significant cost, in that the mechanisms used to hold states ac-
countable are so strong that they undermine the traditional chain of accountability
between constituent and elected official–as in the case of Greece, elections become
meaningless for changing the course of policy, even when parties that are directly
opposed are elected in turn. For example, during the height of the Great Recession
and the start of the emergency lending program for Greece, a center-right party was
in power and was responsible for implementing much of the painful austerity program
that Greeks widely opposed. However, even electing Syriza, the party that ran on
an anti-austerity platform, yielded no significant changes in the course of politics,
because Syriza leadership was accountable to international lenders. Thus, despite
promising no more austerity, Syriza had to renege on its campaign promises and
continue implementing austerity demanded by its international lenders.
These findings have important implications. First, they suggest that the design of
international lending is an essential and overlooked aspect to implementing successful
governing assistance. Whatever the type of assistance being provided, it must account
for the existing democratic institutions in a state, and to the extent possible, support
these existing institutions rather than trying to replace them. Furthermore, even in
cases where it is not possible to always support the existing institutions in a state, it
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is essential that the most important ones be supported so that individuals continue
being able to express their political demands, and so that officials can respond to
them. International lending programs have a dilemma in that there are important
reasons for designing them such that international organizations have some leverage
in changing the behaviors that contributed to economic instability in the first place.
However, they should do more to design them to work in developing democracies.
Conclusion
To this point, much of the research on the governing assistance provided by in-
ternational organizations has focused narrowly on the relationship between governing
assistance programs and how the effect the macro-political contexts in states. For
example, much of the work on international lending programs have focused on how
they affect aggregate economic growth. However, as this project shows, governing
assistance programs affect individuals in meaningful ways. In particular, governing
assistance programs have the capacity to affect how individuals feel about their gov-
ernments and the political institutions in their state by changing the context within
which they make decisions about how and why to participate in politics. This project
argues that international organizations are equally capable of supporting or hindering
democratic governance and theorizes that whether it does one or the other depends on
whether the institutions associated with the governing assistance support or compete
with the existing democratic institutions in the state.
Confidence in democracy as a form of government is essential to the success-
ful consolidation of democratic governance. This project shows that shaping confi-
dence in democracy and democratic institutions is not only the result of country- and
individual-level forces, but that international organizations can significantly alter how
individuals feel and respond to their institutions of governance. More work must be
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done to understand how these effects manifest with different types of interventions,
and the best ways to design interventions such that they can most meaningfully assist
developing states with democratic consolidation. When designed with the findings of
this project in mind, international assistance can further assist the spread of democ-
racy around the globe.
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